Tag Archives: canadian politics

Liberal Leadership

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Over the last two weeks I’ve had a chance to see a number of the candidates in action and thought I share this analysis on the leadership race. I was also prompted by this fun link Rikia S sent me which outlines the current betting odds on the candidates. Of course, before beginning, my standard disclaimer on the Leadership race applies: Anything can happen and predicting this thing, even remotely, is an impossibility. But isn’t that what makes it fun to observer and participate in?

First let’s look at Kennedy, with whom I’ve come to like more and more. I first ran into Kennedy at the Public Policy Forum Banquet in Toronto back on April 6th and he seemed almost shy (to be fair it was a big night for Bob Rae). However, I recently saw him speak, along with Martha Hall Findlay, at the Progressive North Forum and was struck by his (and Martha’s) passion for party renewal. He was also receptive towards the current bee in my bonnet: getting the party to solicit neutral outsiders such as Deloitte or Elections Canada to run internal elections (more on this in the future). Obviously, Kennedy’s key challenge is his inability to communicate with sufficient effectiveness in French. A lot of Liberals are worried about our prospects in Quebec so I imagine that for many delegates, no matter how attractive Kennedy is, this issue is a dealbreaker. That makes Kennedy a long shot.

Of the remaining viable candidates, I confess knowing the least about Dion. However, if there is going to be a dark horse, it is going to be Dion (something confirmed in my mind by today’s EKOS poll cited in the Toronto Star). If he can deliver a rousing speech at the conference then Dion may capture delegates nervous about Rae and Ignatieff. The problem for Dion is that he’s got to capture A LOT of delegates. Still more problematically, delegates don’t follow leaders the way they used to, so even if Kennedy threw his support behind Rae, he still has a big hill to climb.

(For full disclosure I’ve done some policy work on the Ignatieff campaign). Ignatieff delegates number puts him in a strong position. But he has taken a serious pounding in the press of late. The good part of this is that, based on some of the speeches he’s given, he appears to have learned a lot from the process – exactly what a leadership race should do. Prospective Iggy delegates are going to ask themselves two questions: has he learned enough that he is ready to lead, and do I like enough of what he says (on the environment, foreign policy, rural-urban divide, nation in a nation) to counterbalance that which I don’t like (foreign policy, nation in a nation). The bad news for Ignatieff is that he may have to work harder then some of the other candidates to grow. The good news is that he comes into the convention with a lead and so needs to grow less. As Paul Wells pointed out quite some time ago, Ignatieff only has to siphon off 1 in 4 delegates from other candidates to win. That may be harder for him to accomplish today then when Well’s wrote it, but it is not impossible. This is still a race between Ignatieff and Rae.

At that same conference I mentioned above I also shared a panel with Bob Rae. I’ve seen Rae give speeches before but this was first time I’ve observed and engaged him in conversation. The man is clearly the most polished politician among the contenders. His capacity to absorb, dissect and pick apart an argument is everything it is cracked up to be. Regardless of the outcome I’m glad he’s onboard, minds like his can only make the party stronger. Indeed, hanging out with Andrew M. yesterday reminded me of how much crow I’m having to eat about Rae. Given Rae’s history I thought he would be a tough sell in Ontario (he still has a lot of work to do) and that members would be more likely to opt for someone else. It looks like I could not have been more wrong. Rae has avoided the pounding in the press Ignatieff’s received (indeed the G&M’s critical Editorial of him was basically laudatory) but has not been ignored (like Kennedy or Dion). Consequently, for the other candidate, Rae may now be the man to beat – his baggage does not (so far) seem to be weighing him down, he’s fluently bilingual, he’s the most polished and he’s working from a good base.

All this means that the convention will be a rip roaring good time… and that the speeches between ballots will be hyper-important. You will have throngs of delegates looking to be inspired and persuaded – the candidate able to capture that energy is going to have a decisive advantage.

[tags]canadian politics, liberal leadership[/tags]

Op-Ed in Toronto Star

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Given we are hovering around the 50th anniversary of peacekeeping I wrote this op-ed for the Toronto Star. Of course, as I’m in Vancouver I can’t actually see said piece in print but remain hopeful a newsstand here that carries the star.

That might sound easy but you’d be surprised how little actually makes it over the rockies.

The Toronto Star link no longer works so I’ve copied the op-ed into this post.

Suez at Fifty: (Mis)understanding Pearson

On a small non-descript pillar in the lobby of Foreign Affairs Canada hangs Lester B. Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize — a reminder of Canada’s high-water mark on the international stage.Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his and Canada’s suggestion and deployment of a peacekeeping force that would separate opposing forces in the Suez while a peace plan was implemented. Tomorrow marks the 50th anniversary of the UN General Assembly vote to send that police force into Egypt. It was the birth of peacekeeping. For many Canadians, even 50 years later, the crisis remains the defining moment of Canadian foreign policy, symbolizing Canada’s international role as a pacifist intervener that puts global interests before national self-interest.

But where has this ideal led us? Canada’s foreign policy, with its emphasis on multilateralism and the export of Canadian values, has become ever more focused on the goal of improving the world. And yet, despite these efforts, we have never been weaker or more marginal. Even the recent Conservative counterreaction — with its less critical support of America’s unilateral world view — has failed to provide a viable alternative.

What happened? Did Pearson’s success steer Canada in the wrong direction? Are the Suez Crisis and Peace Prize the bane of our foreign policy?

Sadly, the answer is yes. The blame lies not with Pearson but with us and our collective misunderstanding of the man, his ideas and his legacy. Much of the popular imagery surrounding him is myth, a national exercise in selective memory.

If we are serious about building an effective foreign policy for the 21st century, we must confront the central myth of Canadian diplomacy. Contrary to everything you learned, Pearson was neither a Boy Scout nor a dove. He was so much more: a creative problem solver who respected great-power politics and was unafraid to champion Canada’s national interests.

The 50th anniversary of the Suez Crisis and the invention of peacekeeping is the perfect starting point for such a critical reassessment. Contrary to the mythology, Pearson did not advocate peacekeeping out of a humanitarian desire to prevent some far-off war. Rather, he recognized that unlike other conflicts of the time, the Suez Crisis threatened to draw the United States and Soviet Union into direct confrontation. Consequently, it posed a real and direct threat to Canada.

In 1956, intercontinental ballistic missiles were not a significant part of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Consequently, any war between the superpowers would have been fought in the skies over Canada as American and Soviet strategic bombers raced overhead to deliver their nuclear payloads. Pearson’s peacekeeping was not designed to stop a Middle East war but to prevent nuclear bombs from falling out of the sky over Toronto. Self-interested problem solving, not altruism or idealism, launched the peacekeeping project.

Nor was Pearson a dove. Yes, he recognized the essential role played by economic and social resources in improving society and proposed 0.7 per cent as the benchmark for foreign aid. However, he was equally aware of the critical role played by military power in international relations.

Canadians rarely discuss Pearson’s role as key architect, negotiator and signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As he noted of the Soviet threat: “Our defence in this conflict must be one of increasing and then maintaining our strength, while always keeping open the channels of negotiation and diplomacy. Arms must go hand in hand with diplomacy.” This was a man who, when necessary, was unafraid to confront those whose goals were antithetical to Canadian values.

Pearson was a multilateralist, but he was first and foremost a pragmatist. He understood the importance of great-power politics and the limits of treaties. In his own negotiations, he noted that “… if the great powers have the will and desire to co-operate, even if the machine isn’t perfect, it won’t matter very much. It will work. Therefore, Canada’s preoccupation … is based on the hard realities of the existing international situation.” Recent Canadian foreign policy could not be further from this position. From the Land Mines Treaty to UN reform, Canadian efforts to improve the international system invariably focus on perfecting the machinery irrespective of the interests or participation of the great powers.

Unfortunately, we pay a significant penalty for the Liberals’ and Conservatives’ failure to grasp Pearson’s lessons. The Liberals have been more concerned with getting the principles right regardless of superpower interests. This approach feels good, but it erodes Canada’s influence. In contrast, the Conservatives simply substitute American for Canadian interests. Thus, in places like Afghanistan we adopt American strategies and tactics that alienate the local population and put the mission at risk. As a result, this approach may yield the (occasional) American photo op, but it generates neither influence nor results.

It is at home, however, that the real cost of misunderstanding Pearson is felt. Pearson was a Canadian success because he was pragmatic, creative and solved the problems that challenged Canada. The Department of Foreign Affairs remains a creative problem-solver, but it is rarely allowed to be either pragmatic or self-interested. It is no wonder that Canadians have acquiesced to declining defence, aid and foreign policy budgets.

By transforming our foreign policy into at times, a luxury item, a charitable endeavour focused on “raising our profile” or a poor extension of American foreign policy, our leaders have removed foreign policy from the public’s imagination and made it an easy target for budget cutters.

If our foreign policy is to experience another golden age, it must regain its relevance to Canadians. Our leaders need to understand Canada’s interests, articulate them clearly and find a means to advance them in a manner consistent with our internationalist values. Pearson understood this. It also explains why his legacy has been so difficult to grasp. He defies labelling. He was neither a hawk nor a dove, neither pro- nor anti-American. He simply solved Canadian problems in a way that made the world better for everyone.

If we are willing to shed the mythology surrounding the man, we might once again grasp his nuanced view of the world and Canada’s place in it. Then, maybe, the Suez Crisis and the Peace Prize will cease to be a reminder of what we once were and instead serve as a guide for what we can once again become.

[tags]foreign policy, public policy, canadian politics[/tags]