Afghanistan – The Myth of the Opportunity Cost

Does anyone under 35 still ‘watch’ the news? It was refreshing to see after a 10 year hiatus. There was a fantastic piece on Iraqis moving to Syria – a half-million Iraqis now live in Damascus with 1500 more arriving everyday. Unfortunately a piece on Afghanistan served as a reminder of why to stick to print and on-line media.

The CBC report focused on the disparity over the accounting around the Afghan mission. It did so by citing a Polaris Institute study that placed the cost at $4.146B – more than double the government’s estimate. Although the CBC noted the report’s flaws, I’m forced to ask: why even cite something that uses such dubious accounting methods?

So what drove the higher costs in the Polaris’ report? They factored in soldiers salaries and operational costs for ships and other equipment. Even I, armed with the knowledge of Econ 110 course I took 10 years ago understand that many of these items are fixed costs – costs the Canadian tax payer must pay regardless of whether our military is operating in Afghanistan or not.

Still more disappointing was a brief Michael Byers interview where he highlights the high cost of replacing ammunition, arguing that the costs (like these) would be lower if Canada was involved in more ‘traditional’ peacekeeping. I know and like Michael – he’s been very supportive of Canada25 and of me personally. Moreover I know he would prefer that we were in Darfur – but he is misleading the public on two fronts: First, as virtually every military expert has pointed out there are very few ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions out there. Moreover, Darfur, in particular, is not the mission I would choose if I was looking for a safe ‘traditional’ mission. It could get quite ugly, especially given how the Sudanese has government expressed, quite explicitly, that they don’t want us there. Second, the costs of placing Canadian troops in Darfur will not necessarily be dramatically cheaper then having them in Afghanistan.

Both Polaris and Michael Byers suggest we are paying an opportunity cost by being in Afghanistan. Specifically, that we could be doing cheaper, safer work elsewhere. This premise should be questioned. Stationing our troops elsewhere may not be dramatically cheaper. And, while it would likely be safer, it would not be the ‘safe’ peacekeeping of days of old. These missions, which tended to be ceasefire monitoring missions between state actors – simply no longer exist. If are willing to use our military to better the world (as both Michael and Polaris suggest they are) then there are no shortage of missions we could engage in… but we should not fail to commit to one because it means we can’t commit to the next one. This logical conclusion of this argument will leave us at home every time, waiting for the next ‘perfect’ mission. The opportunity cost Polaris and Michael refer to needs to be balanced against performing a mission where we have a national interest at stake. Given it was in Afghanistan where forces organized a deadly strike on the civilian population of our largest ally it seems to me that there is, at the very least, a plausible case for why Canada may have an interest in restoring order to that country.

[tags]public policy, Afghanistan, canadian politics[/tags]

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