Tag Archives: canadian foreign policy

the significance of the afghan poll

In anticipation of the new Environics poll of Afghans I engaged in my biannual ceremonial watching of the CBC news. This poll is groundbreaking stuff since, until now, we’ve had very little data on what Afghans think. What is interesting about the poll isn’t the results per say, but the strength of the results. Equally interesting is the impact this could have politically here at home.

The Results

For example, people’s opinion of Canadian troops in Kandahar is remarkably positive, with 60% having a favourable opinion.

In addition – given the press reports we receive here in Canada – Afghans are actually comparatively upbeat about the effectiveness of the mission is itself.

I’d encourage everyone to take a look at the raw results yourself, they can be found on the Environics webpage.

The political impact

Before we begin, a caveat. I’m sure there are those who are thinking: this poll was commissioned by Conservatives and was rigged to ensure a desirable outcome. This could not be further from the truth. This poll is the brain child of Environics which wanted to bring the Afghan perspective into the debate. It is important to note that Environics is the same company that brought us Fire and Ice, a book that presents a rather unflattering picture of America and argues Americans and Canadians are becoming more different. This is no right wing organization – if anything it leans the opposite way.

I argued earlier in the week that the Liberal position on Afghan has been pretty suspect. This poll makes things worse. To be blunt, it’s a disaster for the NDP and damaging for the Liberals.

The NDP position has been based on the assumption that the mission is a mess. Now we have evidence that Afghans actually want Canadians there, they don’t like the Taliban and they believe we are doing a relatively good job. We can no longer claim we’d be leaving a divided country that doesn’t want us.

For the Liberals the problem is similar – this is the party that spent two decades constructing a foreign policy around the human security agenda. More importantly, it has always wanted Canada’s foreign policy resources to “do good.” It would appear that the Afghans believe we are doing just that. In addition, if we left, we would jeopardizes this success. Both the NDP and the Liberals now have to explain why we should leave and risk abandoning the Afghans.

However, the poll creates a nuanced public policy challenge – one the Conservatives are susceptible to succumbing to. The danger is this poll will eliminate the option to leave Afghanistan under any conditions. This would be a grave mistake. There are a number of things that could dramatically alter the conditions that created this poll’s results. For example, spraying the opium fields with pesticides could turn significant parts of the population against both the international force and the Karzai government. Making the assumption that these polling numbers would be the same under such conditions could trap us in a rapidly deteriorating situation. For the time being, it appears the locals believe we are effective, and are grateful. If our allies take actions that would create a new set of conditions that threaten to destabilize the current environment then we should be prepared to announce we too will take action, including the possibility of pulling out.

the manley inquiry into Afghanistan

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Rudyard Griffiths has been calling for a blue ribbon commission into the future of Canada’s role in Afghanistan for a while. The good news is that the Prime Minister started listening to him. The bad news is that the Liberals are unhappy about it.

To date, the Conservatives have not had an inspired foreign policy. Indeed, they seem to lack confidence on this issue – something that may spring from the fact that this government is built around the old provincial Harris team who obviously didn’t have to think much about the subject. This insecurity – along with a desire to take a politically sensitive issue off the table in time for a possible fall election – has however forced them to adopt Griffiths’ advice.

This is good news for Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. The current debate on the Afghanistan mission has been mired in partisan battles shaped more by who can exploit the situation for political gain than by assessing what is the best option for Canada. On an issue this sensitive and important a blue ribbon panel can help establish a baseline of facts and set the terms of debate in a manner that hopefully elevate the level of discussion. This will help ensure that the country’s best interests – as opposed to those of a given political party – will be the first and foremost criteria of evaluation. In principal this should make it harder for the NDP and those like Michael Byers who advise them, to continue to call for a unilateral withdrawal without discussing the full consequences of such a choice.

In short, if the panel (John Manley, Pamela Wallin, Derek Burney, Paul Tellier and Jake Epp) does its job it can help ensure that Canadians make the best choice for Canada.

The bad news is that Liberals are in a huff about the fact that John Manley’s appointment as the head of this panel insulates the conservative from a sticky issue in the lead up to an election. I can understand how one would lament the loss of a potential “wedge issue” that might have undermined Conservative support, especially in Quebec. But veiled attacks on Manley paint the party in a bad light. And for good reason. Liberals should be proud of Manley – or any Canadian – who attempts to bring coherence, clarity and a basic level of consensus to a debate of national importance.

Liberals are only mad at Manley because they know that although this commission shows the Conservatives are desperate (they are), it also exposes the shallowness of their own policy on the issue. And let’s be clear, the Liberals don’t have a coherent policy on Afghanistan. The current Liberal position of pulling our troops out after 2009 simply plays off the public’s fears. It does nothing to address the actual goals of why Canada is in Afghanistan. It’s odd to watch the party that championed Human Security and R2P argue for getting the military out of a country where the previous government had a complete disrespect for human rights, marginalized women and generally terrorized its own population. Nor is the notion that “it’s somebody else’s turn” inspiring the public. Either a) this mission is important and so if no one else will do it, we must or b) it’s not, and we should get out (and, by the way, if this was the case why did you get us in in the first place?).

Moreover, let’s talk about the costs of leaving – there are people whose lives will be in significantly greater risk if Canada pulls out and the risks of Afghanistan becoming an operational centre for global terrorism are real. Conversely, let’s talk about the costs of staying – such as the fact that Afghanistan is going to be further destabilized this winter when the Americans start spraying Opium crops with pesticides. If this is the way the US is going to behave, maybe we should leave.

But this is the type of nuanced discussion neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives (it’s not worth mentioning the NDP) are willing to have. All that has happened is that the Conservatives realized that this superficial discussion would hurt them more and so they got smart.

So rather than getting mad at Manley Liberals should start coming up with a coherent policy on Afghanistan.

Review of Michael Byers "Intent for a Nation"

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Today, Taylor and I published a review of Michael Byers “Intent for a Nation: A Relentlessly Optimistic Manifesto for Canada’s Role in the World” in Embassy Magazine.

Attached below is the full length version – we strayed far beyond Embassy’s word count…

Intent for a Nation

Michael Byers, Professor of Politics and International Law and regular public commentator, describes his book, Intent for a Nation: A relentlessly optimistic manifesto for Canada’s role in the world, as a challenge to Grant’s generation-defining thesis. Canada, Byers argues, may not be on an inalterable path towards full US integration.

But contrary to its title, Intent for a Nation does not reject its namesakes’ thesis – it embraces it wholeheartedly. Lament for a Nation paints Canada as a country already lost to the forces of Americanization. Byers, in contrast, places Canada on a precipitous edge, teetering on the abyss. Indeed Canada position is so precarious, Byers himself twice believes the country doomed: once after the “Free-Trade election” and again after Chrétien signs NAFTA. And yet, a handful of increasingly rare policy decisions manage, albeit just, to preserve a distinct Canada and Canadian foreign policy. In reality ‘relentlessly optimism’ simply means believing Canada can still be saved.

Intent for a Nation is thus a firmly nationalist treatise – a book that sees Canada under immediate and imminent threat from Americanization – and this perspective is the source of its strengths and weaknesses. As a nationalistic critique, it is often powerful, providing important insights. At the same time, its anti-American lens is extremely limiting. Byers, like Grant or Hurtig, overweight’s America’s role, holding it responsible for almost all Canada and the world’s problems.

As such, this book is as much about America and Americanization as it is about Canadian Foreign Policy. In virtually every instance the analysis inevitably leads to the same conclusion. Canada’s choice is black or white – assimilation or isolation. A choice Byers echoes with chapter titles like “Do We Really Need a Continental Economy?” The face that such a course of action would be a best difficult, and at worst disastrous, is a window into the book’s central limitation – its inability to move beyond critique. For a self titled ‘manifesto,’ the book focuses almost exclusively on what Canada shouldn’t do, and says little about what it should.

That said, it is refreshing to read a strong nationalist critique of Canadian foreign policy, particularly one that adeptly engages on military issues. The argument that the goals and purposes of Canada’s military are increasingly shaped by its integration with US forces is the book’s most convincing discussion. A Canadian military that fully integrates with its US counterpart does indeed run the risk of preparing for, and executing, US styled military operations. As military strategist Martin van Creveld points out, American Forces: “Combine aggressiveness with impatience. Putting blind faith in technology and using far more firepower than is needed, they regularly end up by alienating whomever they face-as happened in Vietnam, Somalia, and now in Iraq.” Do we want to spend (literally) billions to emulate the many idiosyncrasies of the US model? More importantly, if we mold our tools after America’s hammers, should we be surprised if we increasingly see global problems as nails?

In a similar vein, Byers’ discussion of the Canadian Arctic rightly stands in notable contrast to much of the military-centric discourse on ‘securing’ the north. And his treatment of war on terror, racial profiling, and missile defense are all notably level- headed. It is clear that Byers has an important voice to add to the debate. Indeed the problem in each of these cases isn’t what he says, its’ that he doesn’t say more. A strong critique is important, but we were frequently left wondering, what does Byers think Canada should do?

As a manifesto, the book provides few options. Both the chapters on climate change and terrorism never take the reader beyond past mistakes. There are hints of possibilities (such as increased individual responsibility for emission control, and greater use of legal mechanisms in the war on terror), but at markedly few points does Byers provide directions for action. Indeed, his regular calls for national leadership, with little indication of a policy platform, become frustrating.

Take, for example, the treatment of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Byers rightly argues that Axworthy showed prescient leadership by convening the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). He then argues that Paul Martin, and by extension Allan Rock, sold out by presenting a watered down version to the UN General Assembly in 2005.

The principle of R2P is that the international community should have a mechanism to intervene when sovereign governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens. Faced with the problem of how this principle should be actualized, Martin argued that the Security Council’s threshold for the authorization of Chapter VII intervention should be expanded to include a wider range of harms. Byers suggests a more appropriate course would have been to “embark on a long and difficult campaign to shift international opinion towards a right to unauthorized humanitarian intervention.”

This is a strikingly ambiguous, and controversial, statement regarding one of the central foreign policy challenges of our time. We are provided with no indication of what a different legal framework might look like, nor do we receive guidance on how this would mitigate the central concern of R2P’s critics – its abuse by powerful countries over weak ones. Indeed, this policy challenge was so difficult, that the ICISS commission itself deferred answering it and it is the underlying reason why Martin chose to work within the UN framework rather than against it.

In addition to failing to flesh out his policy prescriptions, the few sentences he does provide do not form a coherent list of policies, but rather a catalog of often conflicting reactions.

For example, in a chapter entitled “Climate Change” Byers speaks urgently, but vaguely, of the need for a green economy. But later, in a chapter entitled “Do We Really Need a Continental Economy?” he laments the decline of east-west tractor-trailer traffic across the country and rise of north-south traffic between Canada and the United States. And yet comparatively, this east-west traffic was grossly inefficient. Trade between Seattle and Vancouver is much more efficient – and thus green – than that between Vancouver and Toronto. Byers may be both a nationalists and environmentalist, but he never tackles the tough issue of prioritizing or contextualizing these two policy objectives with respect to one another.

Another example emerges from his treatment of Afghanistan and Darfur. “Where would we gain the most?” Byers asks. “Continuing with a failing counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan or leading a humanitarian intervention to stop the genocide in Darfur.” The choice appears clear: deploy our military to Darfur to project our humanitarian interests. But in order to do so, we would need to pull our troops out of Afghanistan. While our role in Afghanistan should be debated, there are real humanitarian costs to leaving. Not accounting for these costs, in an argument on the moral imperative of inserting military forces – against the desire of its government – into another Muslim country rife with sectarian conflict and radical jihadism is highly problematic.

Similarly, calling Afghanistan a “US led war in Asia” and Darfur a peacekeeping mission trivializes the former and romanticizes the latter. This month rebels killed 10 African Union peacekeepers and a further 50 are missing. Darfur could be every bit as complicated and dangerous as Afghanistan. Both are examples of complex emergencies in which new, and in large part Canadian-led concepts such as 3D and human security, are being applied.

One senses that Byers disdain for Afghanistan springs not from the nature or intent of the mission, but simply that it was American instigated and led. When discussing Afghanistan this bias is merely distracting, but in other cases, the distortions border on the absurd. For example, Byers rightly criticizes successive Canadian governments for failing to give .7% of GDP in overseas development assistance (ODA). However, when assessing why Canada has failed to do so, his culprit is all too predictable. The United States – who contributes a mere .1% of GDP – fear their international reputation will suffer if Canada fulfills its ODA commitment and thus exerts subtle pressure which keeps our contributions down. Putting aside that no examples of how this nefarious influence is exerted, are we really suppose to believe the United States cares how much Canada donates in ODA?

What makes this bias all the more frustrating is that without it, the book would be far more compelling. Byers considers Canada a powerful country, capable of greatness on the international stage. In interviews he fleshes out how internally generated insecurities often impede our success. It is a sentiment we agree with, and to which history can attest. When Canada chooses to lead, our track record has been remarkable. But in his book, this insight is crowded out by the obsession with the United States, who is inevitable blamed for our shortcomings.

If Canada is a powerful country, how should it exert its influence? The final chapter on Global Citizenship is clearly intended to provide an inspiring framework that can tackle the problems Byers identifies. But the conclusion does not unify the book’s varying themes and critiques. It is hard to find the link between the concept of global citizenship proposed and the challenges outlined in the previous 9 chapters. Moreover, Byers’ definition of Global Citizenship ultimately does not differ from those he critiques, as well as others he doesn’t mention, making it difficult to tease out his unique contribution to the debate over this term.

In addition, the book’s obsession with the United States ultimately hinders, rather than enhances, its analysis. Byers’ examples – standing up to the United States and charting a path not determined solely by economic factors – of how Global Citizenship can be actualized at the national, as opposed to individually focus principally on Canada-US relations. Canada must preserve its ability to act independently on the international stage when necessary. But Byers conflates our capacity to act independently with our choice to do so. Are there troubling aspects to the Canada-US relationship? Absolutely. But Byers seems less interested fixing them than firewalling the country off from the United States. Is disengagement and isolationism the logical conclusion of global citizenship? Surely being sovereign, and a global citizen, entails more than not being American?

But this criticism should not diminish the role Michael Byers’ and his book serve as agent provocateurs. Intent for a Nation was written to spark discussion, and in that spirit it is an important contributor to the national debate. He is right to argue that Canada can do more and that message deserves an audience, both in Ottawa and across the country.

As a stand alone piece however, the book lacks cohesion, contains vague and conflicting advice, and overemphasizes the role of the United States. These issues largely spring from the fact that Intent for a Nation embraces the same flawed analysis of its namesake. Four decades after the publication of Lament for a Nation, nationalists continue to cling to the same gloomy predictions. All this despite the fact that Canada has retained its independence, and according to some pollsters, has become increasingly different from the America. Maybe its time we moved beyond the constraints of this thesis?

Africa is not a liberal idea

Responding to David Carment

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David, thank you for posting your comment yesterday. It is clear we both care strongly about the future of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs (CIIA).

In some places – such as the role of fellows – we have an honest difference of opinion. For example, I sense you see the role of fellow as a university does: academics with research agendas. In contrast, I’m advocating for a role similar to that of the Yale World Fellows: a diverse set of interesting people who have an important perspective to contribute. Might this include government officials on leave, former political staffers, or social entrepreneurs? Absolutely.

In other places, it is unclear to me if we agree or disagree. In your original comment you argue the oped was flat out wrong, or “more caricature then valid description.” However, in yesterday’s comment you state “we all know it (the CIIA) has had it problems even its members recognize that, so what you have said in that regard is not new.” I’m not sure you can have it both ways. Either I was wrong and failed to accurately portray the situation or, I was right, and not adding to the debate.

I also don’t mind you being harsh – debate is essential to uncovering truth. However, what concerns me is that you seem less interested in debating my thesis than trying to point out typos in an effort to mock me. You may “not want to debate about the vitality of the CIIA”… but this was the subject of the oped. If we aren’t discussing that, then what is the subject on the table? I’m happy to discuss the immaterial differences between the Embassy and blog versions of my oped, and to acknowledge I identified your university incorrectly, but these discussions won’t weaken or alter the validity of my argument – which I sense is the source of your discontent.

I acknowledge that a number of CIIA members and supporters – including yourself – are upset with the piece, and so in turn with me. However, the decline of the CIIA has been going on for some time, and the window of opportunity to act and renew it is shrinking. Feedback from friends, colleagues and CIIA members suggests I simply pointed out the large elephant in the room. If this prompts a larger rethink about the goals and directions of the organization, then some discomfort among its members is a small price to pay.

What I fear however, is that some people wish to instead circle the wagons – an understandable, but counterproductive reaction. Those of us who are fans of the CIIA, but concerned about its future, will keep wondering… what will prompt the renewal and soul searching the CIIA needs?

Finally, I too was disappointing to see that Ben Rowswell and Farouk Jiwa not included in the Embassy’s list of suggested fellows. Both are exceptional individuals and their respective experience in Iraq and Africa are ones more Canadians should here about. I’m not sure why that happened and will follow up with Embassy – but my suspicion is that it was a matter of space (they were the last two bullets in the list). As for your concerns about my list – they are worse then you feared. I know each of them! But you misunderstand its purpose. I did not propose it as the definitive list, but as an example of the type of fellows I’d like to see the CIC appoint. Moreover, nominating someone I know and have worked with an old boys network does not make. Having the power to limit nominations to a select group and/or control the appointment process to favour long time colleagues does.

Also, I do wish to apologize for getting your university wrong (I’ve corrected it). One of the great things about having a blog is that when genuine errors occur, there are an army of readers – such as yourself – who are kind enough to point them out, which I’m all too pleased to fix.

Reactions to the CIIA post/Op-Ed

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First I want to thank friends – old and new – for your warm emails regarding the CIIA post and subsequent Embassy Magazine op-ed.

I have however, received one critical comment. ~~Ottawa~~ Carleton University Prof David Carment ~~or at least someone posing as David Carment~~ posted the following comment on my blog yesterday.

Did any of you read the Eaves piece in yesterday’s Embassy magazine? I thought it was a bit harsh and more caricature then valid description. Had he sat in on the various Ottawa chapter meetings that CIIA has organized on Failed and Fragile states the picture he portrays would be much different. These meetings have been a nice mixture of young and old, diplomats and practitioners and academics mixed with pragmatism and idealism. I also thought his selection of fellows a bit odd. To my mind a research fellow is someone who has an actual research programme and at least in a few of cases this doesn’t hold. A friend and colleague JS Rioux hasn’t been at Laval for over two years – he now works for the federal government.

He even gets the affiliation of Cohen wrong – he is cross appointed with our school and journalism at Carleton.

Does the CIIA still sponsor a journal or two? It’s worth mentioning. that to rebuff the claim that it is/was out of touch.

A few friends pointed out that curiously, the comment reads like a letter, suggesting it might actually be from an email. So I thought I’d repost it here and see if anyone might be willing to forward along the entire (hypothesized) email chain. If you have a copy please send it to me here.

Just to respond to the letter’s criticisms… If Prof Carment has been attending CIIA meetings that have a good cross section of people (age, background, political perspective) then great! It is my sincerest hope that the CIIA has broadened its membership. However, I’m fairly confident that if we could look at its membership rolls, I’m not sure we’d find the distribution Carment describes.

As for my selection of fellows… I think Carment and I have an honest difference of opinion on who and what the fellows could or should be for. While some of the people I highlighted are academics or emerging academics (and so might have a traditional research agenda) others are very much practitioners whose work affects Canadian foreign policy or sheds light on interesting aspects on international affairs. Others, like JS Rioux and Ben Rowswell, are a little bit of both.

Almost none are from the comfy old-boys network of diplomats and academics (indeed this is why I selected them) but I suggest that each has a unique and important experience to reflect upon and share with the Canadian public (as well as the foreign policy elite).

I used JS Rioux old Laval webpage as a link because it was the only site I could find with at least a partial bio. Apologies that the info is out of date, I thought it better to supply something rather than nothing.

As for the failure to get Cohen’s affiliation wrong, this addition was made to the piece made by Embassy Magazine. I’m sure they regret any error.

I suppose there are those who think the CIIA is fine the way it is… but years of deficit spending and a declining membership tell me that it is not. Yes, my letter was blunt, but at least it asks the tough questions. The CIIA in its present form was unsustainable. Now that it has a saviour, it be a shame if it landed back in its current crisis because it didn’t use the opportunity to evolve.

Note: The David Carment responds in the comment below and then the discussion continues the following day here.

Note to Balsillie: Lack of funding didn't kill the CIIA, its culture did

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Interesting news on the Canadian international policy front. Some of you may have read this story outlining how Balsillie has given $1million dollars, and will lead the fundraising effort for another million, to establish the Canadian International Council.

This is a good news/bad news story with some important lessons for anyone running a national organization.

First, the good news.

Any funding into the study of Canadian Foreign Policy is good news. Thanks to Andrew Cohen, the notion that Canada’s influence in the world is in virtual free fall is now accepted orthodoxy. As Jeffrey Simpson aptly put it: “never before has the world meant more to Canada; never has Canada meant less to the world.” A wider set of voices, activitely engaging in public debates about Canada and the world, should be a welcome development.

Moreover, this move will rescue the fast declining Canadian Institute for International Affairs (CIIA). At one time the CIIA was the crucible in which the international affairs were debated and discussed in Canada. Membership was essential for anyone active in the development of foreign policy.

Times, however, have changed. Today there are a wealth of groups that engage international issues: Engineers without Borders, Journalists for Human Rights, the Canadian Red Cross, Oxfam Canada, Greenpeace, Canadian Council of Chief Executives, etc… offer both a more focused discussion and, perhaps more importantly, tangible impact, in a way the CIIA couldn’t, and the CIC can’t. Common wisdom says the glory days of the CIIA ended for a reason… as the above mentioned list attests, the marketplace simply became more competitive and specialized. That said, it may be that there is both an interest in, and a critical role for, a non-partisan organization that brings Canadians together to talk about foreign policy in the broadest sense. I certainly hope so.

And now, the bad news

Rebranding and plowing money back into the CIIA saves it from having to ask itself the tough question: why is it dying? And have no doubt, the CIIA is dying. This is true in the figurative sense, something John MacNaughton, its chair conceded in the Globe when he noted that the establishment of the CIC “moves CIIA from the deathbed to the launching pad.” It is also true in the literal sense. The average age of the CIIA’s 1300 members is in the 60s and possibly 70s (remember, this is the average age). I went to several events in Ottawa where the under 50 crowd represented maybe 5-7% of the audience.

The challenge for the CIIA, and now the CIC, is twofold, but with a single goal: become relevant by attracting new, younger, members.

Part of this problem is structural. In many chapters (the Kitchener-Waterloo branch being a notable exception) the CIIA has become a place where retired diplomats gather. It’s boards are dominated by retired diplomats (although there is often a token young person, usually from the local university). This means the issues, discussions, and networks are geared towards an older audience. When the CIIA was a place where aspiring diplomats and foreign policy geeks gathered, the network effect caused more young members to join, so they could meet peers who were rising stars. Today, the CIIA is a place where retired diplomats and foreign policy geeks meet, this means the network effects work against younger people, who while possibly keen to learn from wiser souls, recognize they are less likely to meet contemporaries and peers. In short, the CIIA lacks critical mass in the right demographics.

The part of the problem is cultural. CIIA meetings tend to be stuffy, formal events, reflecting the diplomatic tradition from its founding period (1930’s-50’s). While there is not dress code, members tend to wear suits and events focus on speeches with some Q&A. It’s all very traditional, formal and hierarchical. International affairs already suffers from a reputation as a snobby subject, this formality almost certainly discourages novices and younger members from participating, and returning.

In short, the CIIA financial issues were never the problem, just the symptom. The problem is cultural.

Money: an opportunity rife with risk

Without a real change in course, things at the CIC will look very much like they do at the CIIA today. Moreover, if past performance is anything to go by, the selection of 20 fellows will have little impact, and could make things worse. My suspicion (and fear) is that the CIC’s fellowships will become the retirement home for Canada’s foreign policy old guard, men like the eminent and highly qualified Allan Gotlieb. Worse still, the alleged “innovative” choices will people like Jennifer Welsh, Michael Byers or Rob Huebert (just to cover the political spectrum). In reality these people should be “safe” choices. As they, and the old guard, already have a pulpit from which to speak, and have done so effectively. If the CIC wants to be about new ideas and compelling debates, it should bring in some younger and more diverse blood. Perhaps set a target of making a third to half its fellows true “risky” choices – rising voices, or those outside the old safe, stodgy world of the foreign policy cocktail circuit. Ideally, they’d target people with credibility, and an emerging track record of engaging in public debates.

So in closing… here are some people I’d like to see nominated for the CIC fellowships (in no particular order):

And for some older voices probably not on the radar of the CIC I might include:

Daryl Copeland – Public servant, outside thinker
Max Wyman – the arts in Canadian foreign policy
Chief Billy Diamond – business and first nations perspective

So there it is, the unvarnished analysis of the challenges facing the CIC. I’m cheering for them, I just hope they are willing to break the old-boys network mold. If not, we’ll be back where we were in no time.

Op-ed on Iraq and Canada in today's Toronto Star

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Taylor and I have another op-ed in today’s Toronto Star. It isn’t often that we get to see a foreign policy dilemma development in front of us. When we do, we have a rare opportunity, and responsibility, to debate and plan our response. I accept that people may not agree with the prescription… but I would encourage them to at least voice their own proposal.

—

Iraq suddenly appears on Canada’s radar screen
Aug 29, 2007 04:30 AM
David Eaves and Taylor Owen

For the past five years, Canadian leaders have had little to say about the Iraq war. Content not to be in but careful not to be too critical, most have adopted a laissez-faire position on the conflict. This position is unsustainable.

In just over a year’s time, Americans will elect a new president. Regardless of whether the victor is a Democrat or a Republican, the last ardent defender of the Iraq war will have left the international stage and the world will look at Iraq through a new lens. The Iraq war, “Bush’s War,” will be over. Iraq the humanitarian crisis will be in the ascendant.

In anticipation of this emerging shift, the Security Council last week voted unanimously to increase the UN’s role in Iraq. The international body will endeavour to do what it – and notably not what the U.S. military – does best: engage in essential diplomatic, negotiation and humanitarian activities.

And this is only the beginning. While the departure of U.S. and British troops will undoubtedly remove one aggravating factor, sectarian strife, a humanitarian crisis and a failing state will remain.

Within a year, Iraq will have shifted from a precipitous and ill-executed American invasion and occupation, into an internationalized humanitarian crisis.

And a crisis it is.

According to a recent UN report, there are 1.8 million internally displaced persons and 2 million refugees in neighbouring countries, with an additional 40,000 to 50,000 leaving per month; 54 per cent of the population lives below the extreme poverty line of $1 a day; 43 per cent of children under the age of 5 suffer from malnutrition; inflation is 70 per cent, and in 2006 there were 34,452 recorded civilian deaths and 36,685 recorded civilian injuries.

Compare these numbers to Kosovo and East Timor, and add the regional consequences of a prolonged Iraqi civil war, and surely there is a case for active international engagement.

As the recent Security Council resolution indicates, a global strategy is starting to take shape. There will be calls for still greater UN intervention, possibly even a peacekeeping force. Over the next 12 to18 months, an international plan for dealing with Iraq will likely emerge.

Will Canada help shape it?

We could opt not to. That would be politically expedient, although it would confirm our declining status on the international stage.

Or we could see this as a diplomatic opportunity where we are uniquely positioned to lead. Canada is an ally of the United States and Britain but had the integrity and self-confidence to not participate in the flawed invasion. Canada is not burdened with a colonial or imperialist past in the region. Unlike Germany and France, Canada has had limited financial interests in Iraq. And, in contrast to Russia and China, Canada possesses a relatively well-respected record on human rights.

By helping to develop a solution that could bring stability to Iraq, the region and the international community, Canada could shine. Indeed, the parallels to the event that launched Canada’s much vaunted but greatly diminished status as an international peace broker are noteworthy.

During the 1956 Suez crisis, the world’s powers were equally hamstrung. What made us so useful then is what could make us so useful today.

This potential is, of course, complicated by our role in Afghanistan. It could reasonably be argued that Afghanistan is our primary international commitment and that we simply do not have the resources to contribute to two major peace-building efforts. But military constraints need not curtail our diplomatic role in a new UN-led effort in Iraq.

Any future mission in Iraq will require a legitimacy that the U.S. invasion lacked. Our position within the UN, coupled with our unique standing in the international community, could make sure this is achieved.

As a country, we need to remember that, regardless of the causes, Iraq today is a humanitarian crisis and a geopolitical time bomb, a country whose collapse or breakup could destabilize the immediate region, and potentially much more.

Here’s hoping Canadian humanitarianism helps shape the way forward.

Taylor Owen is a doctoral student and Trudeau Scholar at the University of Oxford. David Eaves is a frequent speaker, consultant and writer on public policy and negotiation.

Better late than never…

Canadian Foreign Policy Press Job

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Foreign Policy buffs and International Relations geeks take note:

Embassy Newspaper has just informed me that they are looking for an entry level journalist. This is a great paper to work for. It is small, but has an influential readership: the foreign policy community in Ottawa. If you are starting out and want to learn how the sausage is made, this is probably one of the best places to work.

Journalism Job Posting

Embassy Newspaper is seeking a fulltime journalist to join its Ottawa-based newsroom. The position involves writing in-depth news and features in a fast paced independent newsroom. The ideal candidate will have a strong interest in international issues and Canadian politics and be inclined to put time and energy into developing a deep understanding of the people and issues in these communities.

Strong writing, reporting and communication skills are a must.
Specialized knowledge or interest in an international area and language skills would be an asset.
Embassy has an influential readership of 49,000 and is published every Wednesday by The Hill Times. The newsroom environment is demanding but very positive and open.
Salary $26,000- 28,000 plus benefits and 3 weeks vacation per year and growth potential.

Applicants should submit a well written cover letter, a resume and writing samples in a word format or hard copy (No PDF’s) to:
Anne Marie Creskey
Publisher
Embassy Newspaper
69 Sparks St
Ottawa ON
K1P 5A5

Also, on a completely separate note I’ve recently discovered Picket Boy’s behind the lines coverage of the Vancouver municipal strike now in its 3rd (or is it 4th?) week. For those interested it is worth a look. The two line summary so far is: it’s been a ballad of incompetence (the mayor) vs. miscalculation (the unions). The result is a race for irrelevance. Instead of predicting who will win, I suspect that, as is often the case in these types of negotiations, everybody will lose.

Hope to blog on it shortly.

eaves.ca

if writing is a muscle, this is my gym