Tag Archives: canadian politics

Research on the 1960 Kingston Conference… any leads?

8 Replies

I recently read John Beal’s 1964 book “The Pearson Phenomenon” I found this little gem in the library while looking for books that would have something to say about to Kingston conference that the liberal party held the week of September 6, 1960.

The book is interesting for two reasons. The first is that it is written by an American. (and I thought Americans didn’t care about Canadian politics, especially in 1960?) The second is that it was written in 1964, while Pearson was in office and so reflects the optimism and challenges of that time.

What drew me to the book was what it had to say about the Kingston conference – for which it had a reasonable blow-by-blow account, some transcripts and interviews with key player. Not a ton of material, but at least 15-20 pages worth.

I’ve been struck by how little has been written about the Kingston conference. For those who are also looking for accounts of the event, this book has some of the play-by-play but will almost certainly leave you wanting. If you found a good account of the conference, both of its organization and/or a description of the events, please let me know by e-mailing me or posting a comment. Would appreciate any thoughts ot help…

Stephen Clarkson's Big Red Machine

5 Replies

Not sure I’ll ever get around to writing a full review of this book but, I thought I’d share these thoughts.

Stephen Clarkson’s writes from an old school left perspective. At its best, this perspective can have some significant benefits, as it teases out certain types of conflicts that can be profoundly important. However, in this regard it is also a fairly blunt instrument. By focusing on certain data points and trends it can be helpful in analysing the past, but it locks one into the prism that prevents you from seeing the opportunity of future change (the very problem with this book – as it seems to predict an endless future of liberal victories). At its worst however, it is barely even an instrument of analysis. For example, Uncle Sam and Us : Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State was very long on opinion and quite short on analysis. Moreover, data was carefully selected that would confirm his thesis, while contradictory data was summarily ignored.

Everyone is entitled to their opinion. But what interests me are perspectives that spark new insights and new debate. With Clarkson, one knows his conclusions before reading the book and as a result, I suspect the readership generally self-selects itself. Those who already agree with Clarkson pick up his books, those who don’t, don’t.

Big Red Machine is in keeping with this approach and so has its own hard to swallow statements, like this one of page 5:

“Surprisingly for a party that ultimately help build and manage the capitalist state, it (the Liberal Party) emerged to express the grievances and demands for social justice and economic freedom of those oppressed by the oligarchic power structure that prevailed in the British North American colonies drain the first half of the 19th century.”

Why are social justice and economic freedom incompatible with a capitalist state? From what I have seen social justice is no more at odds with capitalism then it is with every political economic system, be it authoritarian, communist, socialist, nationalist, etc… The real question is how do we manage our political economy to maximize its benefits and minimize social injustice. This was the goal of the progressive movement for much of the 20th century: applying the minimum rule set necessary to enable capitalism to sustain itself and ensure its compatibility with our democratic and social justice values.

In sum, Big Red Machine is an okay book (mind you, having never written a book myself I still have enourmous respect for those who’ve written one, not to mention five or more). But if you’ve must prioritize your time, I might skip it.

To be fair, I’m also bummed that this book displaced Free Culture on my “recently read” list. Now there’s a book that should be mandatory reading!

G&M Op-Ed: Conservatives' misunderstand Canada's Foreign Policy History

4 Replies

Taylor Owen and I published this Op-ed in the online edition of the Globe & Mail today. It argues that the Conservative government’s intention to ignore the 50th anniversary of the Peace Prize is not only poor politics, it’s an indication that they don’t get Canada’s foreign policy history. If they did, they’d know that the principles of our foreign policy represented by Vimy and the Peace Prize may be very different, but they are very much dependent on one another.

Attached below is the original text… which includes a reference to the PM’s upcoming trip to the United Nations for the General Assembly (around the time of the Peace Prize anniversary) which could be a great opportunity to celebrate the achievement. But then… what is the plan?

—

We’ve celebrated Vimy’s 75th, but let’s not forget the Peace Prize’s 50th

2007 is a hallmark year for Canadian foreign policy. It marks the anniversaries of two events through which Canada contributed significantly on the international stage: the Battle of Vimy Ridge and the Pearson Peace Prize. This is a wonderful coincidence. These two moments, and the values they imbue, are defining pillars that have guided our foreign policy.

Sadly, the principles these events represent are frequently held up as opposing ideologically doctrines between which an absolute policy choice must be made. In reality, the very opposite is true. Not only are Vimy Ridge and the Peace Prize both real and important achievements, but the policies and values they embody function far better in collaboration than in isolation.

The first pillar, Vimy Ridge, is a defining moment in Canadian foreign policy. It compels us to remember, and give thanks to, those Canadians whose sense of duty and sacrifice contributed to a greater cause. Equally important, Vimy personifies a Canada that stood by its allies and contributed more than its share. It created a lasting legacy of values that continue to serve us well: courage, allegiance to allies, steadfastness, valour, bravery, principle.

However, we must also remember that the First World War reflects an enormous breakdown in political leadership. It is an example of what happens when Great Powers allow their rivalries to run unchecked. Wonderfully, Canadian foreign policy responded to this deficiency, and evolved to include a second foundational principle: Pearsonian diplomacy.

By providing an innovative solution to the Suez Crisis and preventing its allies from stumbling into a global conflict, Pearson’s prize reflects a different set of values than those of World War 1: honesty, integrity, leadership, principle, and a willingness to question and check our allies. The Peace Prize honours a tradition of diplomacy that prevents us from having to commemorate another Vimy.

While both pillars are critical to an effective Canadian foreign policy, many on both the left and right would prefer to celebrate only one of these great events. Each claims that either Vimy or the Peace Prize imbue ‘true Canadian values’. Both are mistaken. It is the interplay between them that makes Canada a credible and recognized actor in global politics. Notably, this is accomplished by being neither militaristic hawk, nor unwavering peacenik.

There is no doubt that diplomacy was ultimately what prevailed in the Suez crisis, yet it shouldn’t be forgotten that it was backed up by a credible military presence. An idealistic dependency on diplomacy has limits, as Romeo Dallaire is quick to point out. Sometimes it is the threat of force that is required to keep, and increasingly to build, the peace.

Likewise, the use of military force also has its limits. America’s predisposition to rely on force often taints the legitimacy of their military interventions. In contrast, countries respect Canadian interventions because they know of our diplomatic history and leadership in avoiding unnecessary conflicts.

Recent achievements continue to demonstrate the value of carefully weaving together these two pillars. For example, Canada did not participate in the second Iraq war because we rightfully believed diplomacy had not run its course. Ambassador Paul Heinbecker’s Pearsonian UN resolution, proposed on the eve of war, assuaged legitimate international concerns by balancing credible weapons inspections with the threat of force. Had it been adopted, and no weapons found, a disastrous war might have been avoided. As a result countless lives might have been saved and possibly another Peace Prize sent Canada’s way.

Contrast this to the First Gulf war, where diplomacy was allowed to take its course. An important norm of the international system – the unsanctioned use of force – was defended. Canadians fought valiantly not only alongside our Anglo-American allies, but with the legitimacy of a broad 30 nation coalition.

In both of these cases, the Vimy and Pearson pillars worked in tandem and resulted in principled international action.

Sadly, we may be drifting towards an over-emphasis on the Vimy pillar of Canadian foreign policy. The Harper government appears overly romanced by our military tradition, and negligent of our diplomatic history. The UN Peace University in Toronto has recently been closed down and funding for the Canadian International Model United Nations has been cut. More telling and in sharp contrast to the months of time, energy and money that were appropriately dedicated to the Vimy celebrations, the Conservative government’s plan for the Peace Prize anniversary are unclear.

The Prime Minister’s treatment of Peace Prize’s milestone will be telling. If he believes that the second pillar of Canadian foreign policy is indeed symbiotic with the first, the same priority will surely be placed on celebrating its 50th anniversary this fall.

David Eaves is public policy and negotiation consultant who served as lead author of Canada25’s Middle to Model Power. Taylor Owen, is a Doctoral student and Trudeau Scholar at the University of Oxford.

[tags]Vimy Ridge, Pearson, Peace Prize, Suez[/tags]

Why Elizabeth May doesn't want to win…

10 Replies

After the mocking this theory generated in some friendly conversations, I wish I’d blogged on this before it became official!

Ever since Elizabeth May said she would run against Peter MacKay I’ve thought something was up. Why would Elizabeth May run against a popular maritimer, in his home riding, in a province (and region) where environmentalism isn’t high on the agenda?

The answer. Elizabeth May is a pragmatist who doesn’t want to win. Not only that, she doesn’t even want the Green Party to do (too) well. Sound strange? Consider these five points:

  1. Elizabeth May is a liberal (former card carrying member) and beyond her frustration with their inactivity on the environment, she is broadly aligned with them ideologically, policy-wise and politically.
  2. Elizabeth May likely believes she can be more effective championing the environmental outside parliament then inside. Being one of 308 MPs, representing a party without official status (and the resources that come with it) all while burdened with constituency work and the need to log significant time in Ottawa would limit her ability to press her cause. She is freer, more powerful and more influential on the outside.
  3. Elizabeth doesn’t want to further split the centre/centre-left vote. However weak the Liberals environmental record she likely believes the greatest threat to the environment is the Conservatives. Creating a viable Green party increases the likelihood of a conservative majority and the negative environmental policies that come with it.
  4. Elizabeth May realizes her party will never be a viable alternative. The Green’s are a coalition of libertarians, red tories, socialists, and environmentalists. On issues other then the environment there is a lot of poor thinking, little coherence, and virtually no agreement on a broader agenda. This lesson must have been ground home during their most recent policy convention. To become a viable party the Green’s will have to be about more then just the environment and drafting a platform will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
  5. In the unlikely even that both Elizabeth May and the Liberals pull off upsets and win the election, she may have secured herself a cabinet position. If she doesn’t win her seat, she can continue to threaten to bleed votes from the Liberals if they don’t act swiftly and decisively enough, on the environment. From an influence perspective she is in a win-win situation.

In short, Elizabeth May doesn’t want to win elections or build a party. She wants to shape the national agenda and redefine the Liberals. That’s why she cut a deal with Dion and that’s why she’s running against the virtually undefeatable Peter MacKay.

Free inter-provincial trade

2 Replies

Jake McEwan published this op-ed in today’s Toronto Star today. Inspired by a recently released Economist Intelligence Unit report his central point is that “while (canada) joined NAFTA and reduced some international barriers to trade, we have done little domestically to create an internal, national marketplace.”

It is indeed disturbing that in certain sectors it is easier to trade with the US then within Canada. Not to mention that it is a sad commentary on federal and provincial leadership.

[tags]canadian politics, economy, trade, provinces, action canada[/tags]

Toronto Star op-ed on Prime minister and the afghan prisoners

2 Replies

Thursday’s blog piece “the prime minister, the taliban and human rights” was published in the Toronto Star today as an op-ed. You can catch the Star’s version here.

My fear is that this piece will never attract any conservative readers (not because it is in the Toronto Star, but because it is critical of Harper). The fact is, this is an important issue. Ensuring our PoW’s are treated in accordance with the Geneva Convnetion is an essential tactical and strategic tool for our soldiers in Afghanistan. Ethics and values aside, it would be a mistake to discard even on purely military grounds, especially to simply win some small political points at home.

However unlikely the possibility, if the PMO reads this piece I’d understand why they might get angry. That said, I hope it doesn’t prevent them from taking its underlying advice to heart. This is not a partisan issue, this is a “how do we achieve success and protect our soliders in Afghanistan” issue.

(Updated 10:38AM PST) Want to say thank you to the numerous friendly emails. Also my friend Taylor Owen sent me this fantastic piece, which highlights how the current British PoW crisis in Iran feeds off this problem as well…

Liberal Renewal Commission – Report on Civic Engagement

2 Replies

As I discussed in this earlier post the Liberal Party has not published all the Renewal Commission Reports. Of those not published I had thought you could only download the Aboriginal Task Force Paper and the Environmental Task Force Paper.

Apparently, the paper by the task force on Civic Engagement has also been available for some time via its commissioner’s website. You can download it directly here.

Sadly, none of the above reports have been translated…

[Tags] Politics, Public Policy, Liberal Renewal Commission[/Tags]

Afghanistan Op-Ed in Friday's Toronto Star

5 Replies

Taylor and I had an op-ed we’d written on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan published in the Toronto Star on Friday. Below is the original text we submitted to the Star. I like this version as it contains some of the arguments that got cut, most notably that there is a direct connection between our policies in the downtown eastside of Vancouver and the streets of Khandahar. Interestingly, Harper has promised, in the coming weeks, to table a strategy for Afghanistan. Our hope is that it will reflect some of the concerns outlined below.

Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan

Success in Afghanistan remains as vital today as when the government first sent troops, aid workers and diplomats to Kandahar in August 2005. Many Canadians, however, feel unsure about the mission and want to be assured that our government has a strategy. On February 6th, Prime Minister Harper promised as much, stating his government will table a report summarizing the progress and challenges to date, and will make a significant announcement about our next steps. This is an opportunity to clarify our strategy and to unite both Parliament and the country around the largest deployment of Canadian forces since the Korean war.

First, let us be clear. Canada has an unambiguous purpose in Afghanistan. Failure to secure and rebuild will leave the country as a failed state, a neo-Taliban led fundamentalist regime, or a training ground for terrorists. Any of these would fundamentally threaten Afghan human security, regional stability, and our Canadian national interests.

Prime Minister Harper must reaffirm our commitment and clearly articulate our way forward. We suggest that his report must address three critical areas that if left unchecked, will cause the mission to deteriorate and could cause it to fail.

1. Return to a strategy that complements counterinsurgency with reconstruction and the imposition of the rule of law. Over the past year Prime Minister Harper has increasingly relied on failed US policies and rhetoric, compounding existing problems and creating new ones. In a battle for the hearts and minds of southern Afghans, an aggressive approach will do more harm than good.

Militarily, the killing of even one civilian can do great strategic harm, turning entire villages against us. The Taliban use these casualties to great effect, so that some Afghans now fear international forces more than those who brutally ruled over them.

We need to rethink our counterinsurgency strategy, by relying less on military force, and more on innovative local interactions. As a start, we must curtail the use of air strikes, resume the policy of compensating civilian casualties and determine how our forces can best support reconstruction. The Liberal cabinet deliberately chose not to deploy Leopard tanks and CF-18’s, prioritizing interpersonal contact with Afghans over brute military might. The Prime Minister must explain why we deviated from this strategy.

Most importantly, we need to ensure effective governance. Support for the Taliban derived, in part, from their capacity to impose law and order. Many felt a draconian but predictable governance structure was preferable to chaos and anarchy. Afghan’s desperately want the stability and freedom that comes with the rule of law. If we want to win their hearts and minds we must enable them to establish a just and fair system as quickly as possible.

Diplomatically, the Taliban resurgence in the south remains unchecked. Our problem starts, not from lofty negotiations with Pakistan, but from our own polarised view of the Taliban. Like the failed de-Baathification of Iraq, categorising all who support the Taliban as “against us”, both radicalizes and creates enemies out of moderates whose political support could help stabilize the country.

2. Align Domestic and Foreign Policies. Support for US-backed counter-narcotics tactics endangers the Afghan mission. Poppy eradication destroys the livelihoods of many Afghans and fuels Taliban recruitment. Forcing farmers to shift from poppies, which generate $5,200 per acre, to wheat, which generates $121, is unrealistic. Farmers need a viable alternative. One that curtails the influence of warlords and reduces the global supply of heroin.

Internationally, the Canadian government should ally with the British to develop a regulatory regime that legalizes the purchase of Afghan poppy crops. These crops could be used in the legal production of codeine and morphine, which are scarce in the developing world.

The Canadian Government should also support the Afghan mission by curbing demand for opiates the one place it can – at home. In our globalized world there is a direct link between the poppy fields of Afghanistan and overdose deaths in downtown Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. Domestic policies that reduce demand for illegal opiates – such as renewing Vancouver’s Insite safe injection site – diminish the market for these illicit crops and make it easier to shift Afghan farmers to alternatives.

3. Provide clarity of mission. Canadians must be provided with the necessary information to judge our strategy and progress in Afghanistan. When Canada agreed to the Kandahar mission it sought to balance development, military and diplomatic components. Prime Minister Paul Martin outlined this strategy on February 22nd, 2005 when he described how Canadian Forces “…will be assisted by aid officers, who will identify key assistance projects to help to reduce tensions, and by diplomats, who will work with the provincial and local authorities in building confidence with the local population.” Are we still implementing a 3D strategy? If not, why not? If so, what are the benchmarks with which we can measure our success and evaluate the balance between our defence, development and diplomatic efforts?

Transparency is particularly important for effective humanitarian assistance. Critical questions remain unanswered. Where is our development money going? How much are we spending, and on what? Are these programs symbiotic with our military and diplomatic operations?

The Government would be well advised to establish a development measurement framework with clear milestones, based on the Afghanistan Compact, enabling projects to be evaluated and held accountable. Canada could also appoint a Director of Reconstruction to serve as a counterpart to our military commander and charged with achieving our development objectives. Combined, these initiatives would enhance security by ensuring those programs that most positively impact the lives of local Afghans are prioritized and monitored.

While we are but one partner of a large coalition, smart, targeted Canadian policies can make a substantial difference. Because the Afghanistan mission is difficult and, at times, dangerous it continues to test our leadership. Harper’s report is timely, but will only be valuable if he addresses head on the critical challenges we face. Canada needs a clear strategy for success – one that builds trust, engages in development and reconstruction, and ensures the rule of law, simultaneously. Without such a strategy we risk defaulting to a US-style military approach, neglecting development and diplomacy. This is Canada’s mission – let us ensure we tackle it Canada’s way.

 

[tags]Afghanistan, Canadian Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Canada in the World[/tags]

Democracy vs. Gender: The Liberal Solution (part II)

Leave a reply

Interestingly, as this 2001-02 Statistics Canada spreadsheet shows, 42% percent of registered undergraduates are male while 58% are female. Moreover, it is my understanding that these stats have gotten even more lopsided since this study was published. Indeed, from some professors I’ve talked to it is not unusual to have classes that are split 70-30 or even 80-20 in favour of female students.

I’m not sure that anyone has really grasped the seachange this will have on our society. For example, I’ve spoken to managing partners at law firms who are trying to “figure out” how to retain female attorney’s. They’d better work harder at cracking this problem – otherwise they’ll will wake up one morning and find there are no attorney’s left to make partner.

Many in management seem to still operate in an accomodation mode, trying to figure out how to alter the workplace on the margins in order to retain female talent. Marginal change will simply not cut it. Among professional firms the demand for greater flexibility to ensure a more effective balance between family and career will probably require significant structural changes to how firms are organized. Making women (or men) choose between the work or family is not going to cut it. In an aging workforce where their skills are in demand they will take their labour elsewhere. But here’s the bigger catch. Many, many men are going to demand this same flexibility as well. Consequently, I suspect this issue will be not framed in terms of a gender, but either as a general HR management challenge or a policy challenge that discriminates between married and single workers.

Politically, the interesting repercussion from all this is that, in 30-40 years, I suspect at least 50% of candidates could be women. Indeed we could end up in a world where the challenge is trying to achieve a candidate field that is at least 33% male. Wouldn’t that be interesting…

[tags]politics, gender, education, public policy[/tags]

Democracy vs. Gender: The Liberal Solution

2 Replies

Dion’s most notable promise of the leadership race was guaranteeing that at least 33% of Liberal Party candidates will be women. This is a laudable goal. Moreover, I suspect the press will follow it closely. If the Liberals fail to reach it Dion’s credibility could be seriously undermined. It is would not be unreasonable to ask: if Dion can’t implement change within a party he controls, how does he intend to affect change if in government?

Some people are – justly – worried about how the goal will be met. Obviously there is a tension between allowing open and democratic nomination contests and ensuring that at least 33% of candidates are women. The easiest option would be to appoint female candidates. This however, carries with it some significant costs. In addition to being bad for morale, disenfranchised riding associations may not donate their time, energy and money to an appointed candidate (male or female) thereby diminishing their chances of winning the actual election.

However, what I have seen in British Columbia (so far) has been an interesting and compelling solution to this quandry. Rather than rig nomination processes (or eliminate them altogether) the party is making two smart plays. First, it is aggresively seeking out highly qualified women in an effort to create a rich pool of candidates. Second, (and this is most compelling part) it is making a direct appeal to members. It is, in effect, saying: when selecting who to support we understand that each of you has a criteria by which you evaluate candidates, we would greatly appreciate it if you made gender a stronger component in this criteria. Interestingly, this appeal could be doubly effective because membership lists may remain closed. Consequently, those campaigning for nomination will probably not be able to sign up new members and with thus have to appeal to the current pool of members (who are more likely to take this messaging to heart).

Best of all, I like what this messaging says about the party. Rather than adopt some centralized top-down way to shape and control the outcome this approach is compelling, appropriate and democratic because it does the exact opposite, it respects and appeals to the intelligence and integrity of party members. Very clever, and very liberal, indeed.

[tags]politics, canadian politics, liberal party of canada [/tags]