Category Archives: public policy

re-centralizing the internet?

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So my buddy Mike B recently had a post linking to an absolutely hilarious “director’s cut” of Rooster Teeth’s commercial for the Madden07 video game. After showing it to some friends on Saturday, I tried again on Sunday and… somewhat ominously, the video had disappeared.

The “director’s cut” shows a remake of the original Madden07 commercial but with Dallas Clark – a fairly average tight end for the Indianapolis Colts – shaking tackles, scoring touchdowns, kicking field goals and generally appearing invincible while being mockingly praised. Rooster Teeth published the video after Clark complained about the original commercial in which his (virtual) likeness is brutally tackled by some (virtual) Philadelphia Eagles.

There are two sad, but important, points to this story. Least important is that Rooster Teeth felt it had to pull the video. Obviously someone, most likely lawyers representing Dallas Clark, the NFL players association, EA Games or the NFL (and possibly all the above) threatened Rooster with something unpleasant. Ok, disappointing… but until Lawrence Lessig convinces the US Supreme Court otherwise, I realize this is the world we live in.

More troubling though is how the video has completely vanished. Up until a year ago, a video like this would have spread virally through the internet so that even if the original was yanked, interested viewers could still find a copy. This is, for me, the first time I have seen something disappear from the internet. It’s not even on YouTube! Because everyone linked to the original video, once Rooster Teeth yanked the feed everyone’s links simply broke. Good news for Rooster, but maybe, indeed likely, bad news for the rest of us…

(obviously, if anyone has tracked down a copy of said video, please let me know so that I can enjoy the happy task of recanting this post!)

The DOW and Model Powers in Afghanistan

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Modeling Power in Afghanistan?

For those interested in Canada and Afghanistan do read Graeme Smith’s piece, “Doing it the Dutch Way in Afghanistan” in Saturday’s Globe and Mail. The Dutch have (apparently) been posted to a rough part of Afghanistan but have yet to suffer a casualty. All this is thanks to a novel strategy… treating the locals well and co opting the local power elite. Some of it may be luck, but it definitely deserves a look into by our boys over at DND. Certainly makes the piece Harper co-authored with Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende in last week’s Globe and Mail a more interesting read. Our strategies may be aligned but our tactics aren’t…

Failing to follow the US economy DOWn:

On a different note, my brother and I had a long conversation on Sunday and he pointed out something quite very interesting… why does the DOW continue to rally despite a stream of (fairly) depressing economic news out of the US? His thought: a significant portion of revenues earned by DOW listed companies now come from overseas operations. Consequently, these corporations are increasingly insulated from the US economic cycle (obviously this has its limits, a collapsing US economy would sink us all). Nonetheless, if true, he posited that the DOW may no longer be a good indicator of the US economy. Maybe the US economy is in worse shape then we think… we just don’t know where to look for the evidence??? Thanks bro.

Limits of the Nanny State

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Elizabeth Renzetti has a great piece in this weekend’s Globe and Mail on the British Government compelling the parents of yobs (unruly youth) to take parenting courses… all in the name of law, order and improved community, of course. The specifics of the piece are less interesting then its overall significance – what the cutting edge of the “nanny state” looks like in action. If this is how the rubber hits the road for ‘the third way,’ who would implement it here? The Libs? The Conservatives?

A Nation Alone

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Barring some dramatic change of heart by one of the main parties it appears the House will pass a resolution acknowledging Quebec as a nation within a nation. Obviously, the news commentary has focused on what this means for the country and its politics. This is clearly a departure from Trudeau’s vision of Canada, but beyond that, it is unclear if anyone understands the implications of this vote. As my friends know, I work as a negotiation consultant, and despite all the discussion surrounding the resolution, from a negotiation perspective, I feel one issue has gone unmentioned.

For many Quebecers this resolution is likely not an affirmation, but a reaffirmation. For declaring Quebec a nation within a nation reaffirms the ‘two’ founding nations vision of Canada. And therein lies the problem. Nationalist Quebecers don’t need Canada to recognize or affirm it as a nation – it already knows it is. The challenge for Quebec nationalists is that they need the rest of Canada to perceive itself as an (English) nation. And yet, most Canadians outside Quebec don’t see themselves as part of any (particularly English) nation. I’m not sure ‘English Canada’ shares a common sense of heritage, destiny, collective identity or any of the other ingredients of nationhood… independent of Quebec. (Sidenote: Some Ontarians who see themselves as part of a nation, might disagree, but I can inform you that Nova Scotians and BCers don’t feel part of the Ontario nation). While this could change, as it stands today ‘English’ Canada appears to possess a largely post-nationalist view of itself. They see their country as composed of 10 provinces and 3 territories that are more or less equal. Shaking them from this view will be neither easy, nor pleasant. Which brings us back to that serious dilemma confronting Quebec nationalists. Specifically, what is the value of being the sole nation in what is supposed to be a bi-national federation? If who you perceive as ‘the other’ doesn’t share this bi-national vision – who do you negotiate with?

Consequently, this resolution doesn’t get to the heart of the matter. It does not reconcile the two competing conceptions of the country (10 equal provinces vs. two founding nations). Instead, the resolution is premised on the assumption that enough soft-nationalist Quebecers will be satisfied with a theoretical reaffirmation of the two founding nation thesis to counterbalance harder nationalist who either want out of the federal structure altogether, or who wish it operationalized and/or re-institutionalized their bi-national view of Canada.

That assumption may be correct – I genuinely don’t know. But is seems to me that, nation or no nation, resolution or no resolution, the real question, and answer, to the issue of Canadian unity remains unchanged: Are ‘English Canadians’ willing to re-cast the federal structure along bi-national lines or do Quebecers believe their national aspirations can be achieved as one of ten provinces within a federated Canada?

[tags]canadian politics, quebec, negotiation[/tags]

My Faith in Humanity…

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… has been tested.

I love my city. I love the people here. Obviously I’m biased – but I think Vancouverites are among the friendliest people in the world. Sadly, this has been a rough week. Not because of the storms or excessive rain (we can tough that out). No, I’m talking about the frenzy a handful of my fellow citizens have worked themselves into over the issue of turbid water.

For those not in the know, the excessive rain has caused increased ‘turbidity’ (or sediment) in the water supply. This hasn’t made the water anymore dangerous but, to be safe, the local government has advised that people drink only boiled or bottled water. As this Sun article points out, city health officials are stressing that no harmful bacteria have been found and there are no reports of illnesses caused by the water.

So let’s be clear, for the household user, there is no water shortage (god knows that is hard to imagine in Vancouver). We still have virtually limitless water, it just needs to be boiled. Indeed, given the rain, putting a bucket outside would probably yield a fair amount of clean water in short order…

So it is crushing to read a story like this. Fistfights over bottled water? This would be at best childish, and worst sad, if it weren’t for the fact that Vancouver can expect to be hit by a major earthquake. Yes, it is only a handful of people, but if we react like this to what, at worst, is an inconvenience, how will we react when confronted with a real crisis?

I still have faith my city won’t turn into a bad post-apocalyptic American TV show… but I’m not longer confidently wandering around believing ‘it could never happen here.’

Afghanistan – The Myth of the Opportunity Cost

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Does anyone under 35 still ‘watch’ the news? It was refreshing to see after a 10 year hiatus. There was a fantastic piece on Iraqis moving to Syria – a half-million Iraqis now live in Damascus with 1500 more arriving everyday. Unfortunately a piece on Afghanistan served as a reminder of why to stick to print and on-line media.

The CBC report focused on the disparity over the accounting around the Afghan mission. It did so by citing a Polaris Institute study that placed the cost at $4.146B – more than double the government’s estimate. Although the CBC noted the report’s flaws, I’m forced to ask: why even cite something that uses such dubious accounting methods?

So what drove the higher costs in the Polaris’ report? They factored in soldiers salaries and operational costs for ships and other equipment. Even I, armed with the knowledge of Econ 110 course I took 10 years ago understand that many of these items are fixed costs – costs the Canadian tax payer must pay regardless of whether our military is operating in Afghanistan or not.

Still more disappointing was a brief Michael Byers interview where he highlights the high cost of replacing ammunition, arguing that the costs (like these) would be lower if Canada was involved in more ‘traditional’ peacekeeping. I know and like Michael – he’s been very supportive of Canada25 and of me personally. Moreover I know he would prefer that we were in Darfur – but he is misleading the public on two fronts: First, as virtually every military expert has pointed out there are very few ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions out there. Moreover, Darfur, in particular, is not the mission I would choose if I was looking for a safe ‘traditional’ mission. It could get quite ugly, especially given how the Sudanese has government expressed, quite explicitly, that they don’t want us there. Second, the costs of placing Canadian troops in Darfur will not necessarily be dramatically cheaper then having them in Afghanistan.

Both Polaris and Michael Byers suggest we are paying an opportunity cost by being in Afghanistan. Specifically, that we could be doing cheaper, safer work elsewhere. This premise should be questioned. Stationing our troops elsewhere may not be dramatically cheaper. And, while it would likely be safer, it would not be the ‘safe’ peacekeeping of days of old. These missions, which tended to be ceasefire monitoring missions between state actors – simply no longer exist. If are willing to use our military to better the world (as both Michael and Polaris suggest they are) then there are no shortage of missions we could engage in… but we should not fail to commit to one because it means we can’t commit to the next one. This logical conclusion of this argument will leave us at home every time, waiting for the next ‘perfect’ mission. The opportunity cost Polaris and Michael refer to needs to be balanced against performing a mission where we have a national interest at stake. Given it was in Afghanistan where forces organized a deadly strike on the civilian population of our largest ally it seems to me that there is, at the very least, a plausible case for why Canada may have an interest in restoring order to that country.

[tags]public policy, Afghanistan, canadian politics[/tags]

Op-Ed in Toronto Star

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Given we are hovering around the 50th anniversary of peacekeeping I wrote this op-ed for the Toronto Star. Of course, as I’m in Vancouver I can’t actually see said piece in print but remain hopeful a newsstand here that carries the star.

That might sound easy but you’d be surprised how little actually makes it over the rockies.

The Toronto Star link no longer works so I’ve copied the op-ed into this post.

Suez at Fifty: (Mis)understanding Pearson

On a small non-descript pillar in the lobby of Foreign Affairs Canada hangs Lester B. Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize — a reminder of Canada’s high-water mark on the international stage.Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his and Canada’s suggestion and deployment of a peacekeeping force that would separate opposing forces in the Suez while a peace plan was implemented. Tomorrow marks the 50th anniversary of the UN General Assembly vote to send that police force into Egypt. It was the birth of peacekeeping. For many Canadians, even 50 years later, the crisis remains the defining moment of Canadian foreign policy, symbolizing Canada’s international role as a pacifist intervener that puts global interests before national self-interest.

But where has this ideal led us? Canada’s foreign policy, with its emphasis on multilateralism and the export of Canadian values, has become ever more focused on the goal of improving the world. And yet, despite these efforts, we have never been weaker or more marginal. Even the recent Conservative counterreaction — with its less critical support of America’s unilateral world view — has failed to provide a viable alternative.

What happened? Did Pearson’s success steer Canada in the wrong direction? Are the Suez Crisis and Peace Prize the bane of our foreign policy?

Sadly, the answer is yes. The blame lies not with Pearson but with us and our collective misunderstanding of the man, his ideas and his legacy. Much of the popular imagery surrounding him is myth, a national exercise in selective memory.

If we are serious about building an effective foreign policy for the 21st century, we must confront the central myth of Canadian diplomacy. Contrary to everything you learned, Pearson was neither a Boy Scout nor a dove. He was so much more: a creative problem solver who respected great-power politics and was unafraid to champion Canada’s national interests.

The 50th anniversary of the Suez Crisis and the invention of peacekeeping is the perfect starting point for such a critical reassessment. Contrary to the mythology, Pearson did not advocate peacekeeping out of a humanitarian desire to prevent some far-off war. Rather, he recognized that unlike other conflicts of the time, the Suez Crisis threatened to draw the United States and Soviet Union into direct confrontation. Consequently, it posed a real and direct threat to Canada.

In 1956, intercontinental ballistic missiles were not a significant part of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Consequently, any war between the superpowers would have been fought in the skies over Canada as American and Soviet strategic bombers raced overhead to deliver their nuclear payloads. Pearson’s peacekeeping was not designed to stop a Middle East war but to prevent nuclear bombs from falling out of the sky over Toronto. Self-interested problem solving, not altruism or idealism, launched the peacekeeping project.

Nor was Pearson a dove. Yes, he recognized the essential role played by economic and social resources in improving society and proposed 0.7 per cent as the benchmark for foreign aid. However, he was equally aware of the critical role played by military power in international relations.

Canadians rarely discuss Pearson’s role as key architect, negotiator and signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As he noted of the Soviet threat: “Our defence in this conflict must be one of increasing and then maintaining our strength, while always keeping open the channels of negotiation and diplomacy. Arms must go hand in hand with diplomacy.” This was a man who, when necessary, was unafraid to confront those whose goals were antithetical to Canadian values.

Pearson was a multilateralist, but he was first and foremost a pragmatist. He understood the importance of great-power politics and the limits of treaties. In his own negotiations, he noted that “… if the great powers have the will and desire to co-operate, even if the machine isn’t perfect, it won’t matter very much. It will work. Therefore, Canada’s preoccupation … is based on the hard realities of the existing international situation.” Recent Canadian foreign policy could not be further from this position. From the Land Mines Treaty to UN reform, Canadian efforts to improve the international system invariably focus on perfecting the machinery irrespective of the interests or participation of the great powers.

Unfortunately, we pay a significant penalty for the Liberals’ and Conservatives’ failure to grasp Pearson’s lessons. The Liberals have been more concerned with getting the principles right regardless of superpower interests. This approach feels good, but it erodes Canada’s influence. In contrast, the Conservatives simply substitute American for Canadian interests. Thus, in places like Afghanistan we adopt American strategies and tactics that alienate the local population and put the mission at risk. As a result, this approach may yield the (occasional) American photo op, but it generates neither influence nor results.

It is at home, however, that the real cost of misunderstanding Pearson is felt. Pearson was a Canadian success because he was pragmatic, creative and solved the problems that challenged Canada. The Department of Foreign Affairs remains a creative problem-solver, but it is rarely allowed to be either pragmatic or self-interested. It is no wonder that Canadians have acquiesced to declining defence, aid and foreign policy budgets.

By transforming our foreign policy into at times, a luxury item, a charitable endeavour focused on “raising our profile” or a poor extension of American foreign policy, our leaders have removed foreign policy from the public’s imagination and made it an easy target for budget cutters.

If our foreign policy is to experience another golden age, it must regain its relevance to Canadians. Our leaders need to understand Canada’s interests, articulate them clearly and find a means to advance them in a manner consistent with our internationalist values. Pearson understood this. It also explains why his legacy has been so difficult to grasp. He defies labelling. He was neither a hawk nor a dove, neither pro- nor anti-American. He simply solved Canadian problems in a way that made the world better for everyone.

If we are willing to shed the mythology surrounding the man, we might once again grasp his nuanced view of the world and Canada’s place in it. Then, maybe, the Suez Crisis and the Peace Prize will cease to be a reminder of what we once were and instead serve as a guide for what we can once again become.

[tags]foreign policy, public policy, canadian politics[/tags]