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myforeignpolicy.ca

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So in February, during the online discussion with Granatstein and Axworthy, when I picked up on the Canada25 Middle to Model Power thread and argued that:

“As a country we may appear adrift, but, as individuals, Canadians are more effectively and successfully engaged than ever. Quietly, we’ve transitioned from a middle power — a plucky country whose government prevented conflicts and ensured stability — to a model power — a country whose plucky citizens innovate solutions to new global challenges.”

and that

“In an era where technology enables individuals to self-organize, deploy resources, or simply get involved, Canadians have jumped at the opportunity.”

These women – profiled by the Globe & Mail – pretty much refer exactly to what I was talking about.

They are making their own foreign policy – and power to them.

Gordon Foundation Global Youth Fellowship

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An annual tradition I’ve come to enjoy is putting up this post. The people at the Gordon foundation are wonderful and those I’ve talked to about this program have had very positive things to say. While our government may be running a shoddy foreign policy there are no shortage of interesting discussions or opportunities for Canadians. The new CIC fellowships, the dialogue over at Canada’s World,  are but two of the numerous new ways to write, think, talk or act on international issues…

Anyway, back to the Gordon Foundation:

The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation has put out its call for applications for the 2008 Global Youth Fellowship program. The Fellowships are targeted towards emerging Canadian leaders who demonstrate potential to enhance Canada’s role on the world stage. The Fellowships will provide successful candidates with a cash award of $20,000 as well as other forms of support.

To be eligible for consideration, applicants must be Canadian citizens or permanent residents between 24 – 35 years of age with previous international experience – paid or volunteer. They also need to demonstrate a sustained commitment to international issues through studies, career choices and volunteer activities.

Application Deadline: Thursday, April 10, 2008 by 5:00 p.m. EST

More information about the Fellowship programme, including application forms, guidelines and information on current and past Fellows, can be found on their website.

Post a question on Canada's role in the world for Axworthy, Granatstein and myself to discuss

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This Tuesday, February 19th, the Globe and Mail will be hosting an online discussion/Q&A with myself, Lloyd Axworthy and Jack Granatstein. In the lead up to this event each of us was asked to write an opinion piece outlining what our vision for Canada’s role in the world.

This discussion will not be like the Globe’s regular one-hour live discussions. Rather, it’s a question-and-answer session. If you are interested in submitting a question, please submit it before 5 p.m. EST today. Answers will be posted no later than 5 p.m. EST on Tuesday. You can submit questions on Tuesday, or in advance, here.

Axworthy’s opinion piece was published on Saturday and can be read here. Granatstein’s was published today and can be read here. My own piece can be read here.

This event was organized by the Globe and Mail and Canada’s World – a national citizens’ dialogue on international policy. You may also be interested in checking out this poll, conducted by the Environics institute.

Why we are having the wrong debate on Afghanistan

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Why is it that we continue to see the Afghanistan mission through the lens of peacekeeping, as opposed to peacebuilding? This fact seems to underlie and shape the entire debate – forcing us to ask the wrong questions and driving all our political parties to poorly thought out solutions.

Take, for example, the new Liberal position that insists on a non-combat role. As Rosie Dimanno points out in a recent Toronto Star article the number of Canadian troops killed in combat in Afghanistan last year was 0. 12 were killed by improvised explosive and 11 by roadside bombs and land mines. In addition there have been deaths from accidents. But there has not been a single combat death since Sept 3. 2006. One is forced to ask… why insist on a non-combat role? It is because this is what we’d like the mission to entail? Or because this is what the mission does entail. Although we may wish it, we are not peacekeeping. Our troops are not positioning themselves between enemy combatants in an effort to prevent them from fighting. This is peacebuilding – we are one of the combatants and we should not pretend otherwise.

The risks of pretending we are peacekeeping however, are significant. As she points out:

If Liberals are trying to spare Canadian lives – by venturing passively, ducking into calmer territory and promoting reconstruction in the absence of a secure environment – an anti-combat insistence is utterly without merit.

But it might get Canadian troops killed. An enemy that knows troops won’t fight back, can’t fight back because of political handcuffs slapped on half a world away, is an enemy given a blood-embossed invitation to attack at will.

Her article may be alarmist, but its central argument is correct. As General Lewis Mackenzie confirms, denying our troops the capacity to take advanced actions to protect themselves – or the NGO’s and aid workers attempting to rebuild Afghanistan – is sheer folly. Our polticians owe it to both the public and our military to be honest about what this mission requires of us.

Which brings us to a second distortion. In a peacekeeping mission one would want to know other countries are participating. A broader coalition means more countries are fostering international pressure to end the conflict and bring their peacekeepers home. Again, however, we are not in a peacekeeping mission. Either we believe an unstable Afghanistan is a threat to our national interest or we don’t. If it is a threat, why does it matter what our NATO allies think? Did we, prior to the second world war, wait to see who else signed up before committing to action? Of course not. The cause was important enough for us to commit ourselves. Nor, after 1943, did we say “we’ve done our part, time for someone else to step up.”And yet this is precisely how we are presently framing the issue.

As a result our national debate over Afghanistan actually undermines our efforts to solicit support. Our politicians end up treating Afghanistan as a duty – something, like peacekeeping, we do to maintain for humanitarian reasons, or to buttress our reputation within NATO or the United States. Not once in the last few months has Afghanistan been described as an imperative. But few, if any countries, are willing to put their soldiers in harms way out of a vague sense of obligation to an international body. Countries – and Canada should be among this list – should put their soldiers in harms way with enourmous trepidation, and usually only when they believe vital national interests are at stake. By telling our allies “it’s someone else’s turn” we risk conveying that we really don’t believe this mission is vital. If it were, we’d be asking them to work along side us, not replace us.

At present, it appears the majority of our allies don’t believe a stable Afghanistan is essential to global peace and security. This is either because it isn’t, or because we’ve failed to convince them. This is a difficult assessment to make and I’d be foolish to claim that I know the answer with complete certainty. That said, I suspect – as Paul Wells points out – our diplomat efforts to make the case have been weak at best.

Canada must decide for itself if we think a stable Afghanistan is critical to the stability of the international system and thus, in turn, our national interest. Sadly, I’ve heard little of this in the discussion among the political parties. And yet addressing this underlying question would not only be the more honest approach, it might cause the “are we in” or “are we out” debate to simply disappear.

The Problem with the Manley Panel on Afghanistan

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Last Friday Michael Byers wrote this opinion piece entitled “Why I Said No to the Manley.”

As some of you know, I believe – with numerous reservations – that the Afghan mission is important. Moreover, I don’t always agree with Michael Byers. Although I think Canada’s work in Afghanistan should continue (under the right circumstances) I hope Byers op-ed is widely read. It is the most damaging critique of the Manley inquiry I’ve seen to date. In short, it is extremely well written and brings together all the criticisms in one place and delivers them with tremendous force.

The most stinging critique for me was about the panel’s independence. As Byers notes:

The Institute for Peace (which coordinated the Iraq Study Group in the United States) set up four working groups composed of non-governmental experts from across the political spectrum. It established a “military senior adviser panel” composed of retired rather than serving officers.

The Manley panel is inordinately dependent on the government. Its six-person secretariat is made up of some of the same officials who have been overseeing the Afghanistan mission. Prominent among these are David Mulroney, the current director of the government’s Afghanistan Task Force, Sanjeev Chowdhury, the former director of the Afghanistan Task Force, and Col. Mike Cessford, the former deputy commander of the Canadian mission.

Byers is bang on. There is something deeply problematic about having the same people who worked on Afghanistan and helped shape the strategy and plan, reviewing themselves to determine if they’ve taken the right course of action and if the country should continue along the same course. This is akin to allowing students to grade their own work and determine if they should continue on to the next level. While it is possibly they will conduct an objective review, the incentives, temptations and interests (for example, one’s public service career could be on the line) create powerful doubts about there ability to do so.

This is neither in the public’s interest, the Afghan mission’s interests, or our soldiers interest.

the CIC Fellowships

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The CIC has announced the conditions for its fellowships. The great news is that they
have a category for emerging talent and established individuals. Better still, in both categories the fellowship isn’t limited to academics. Indeed, a truly fantastic candidate doesn’t need to meet any of the criteria. I’d hoped it would be this way. Now it is.

Junior Fellowships:

  • Academic applicants for a Junior CIC Fellowship must have completed their doctorate prior to taking up the fellowship.
  • For other applicants, an equivalent level of professional achievement is expected. A minimum of 5 years of work experience is required.
  • Applicants are not permitted to hold two fellowship positions concurrently.

Senior Fellowships:

  • Academic applicants must hold a completed PhD degree.
  • For other applicants, an equivalent level of professional achievement is expected. A minimum of 10 years of work experience is required.
  • Applicants are not permitted to hold two fellowship positions concurrently.

The CIC reserves the right to appoint exceptional individuals to become a CIC Fellow outside of the application process.

Next up, I’ve got to start persuading the people I mentioned in my previous post on the subject to apply (at least eventually) and make a contribution.

This is a great first step for the CIC… let’s hope it continues.

Afghanistan and Vancouver's Downtown Eastside

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Taylor and I published this op-ed in today’s Toronto Star. It is not often that one can show a direct link between our soldiers in Afghanistan and Canadians in downtown Vancouver.

We originally entitled the piece: From Kandahar to Carnegie – dealing with the opium trade at home and abroad a title I think sounds better. I suspect however that the Star justly felt the reference to the Carnegie Centre – the community centre that serves Vancouver’s downtown eastside – may have been to obscure, especially for Toronto readers.

Failed strategy connects Afghan fields, city streets

Dec 07, 2007 04:30 AM

David Eaves
Taylor Owen

In the coming months, under the leadership of the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, U.S. private contractors will likely attempt to fumigate poppies in Afghanistan. Around the same time, the Canadian government will decide whether to shut down the Insite supervised injection site in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.

The two policies are inextricably linked and unambiguously bad.

In April, the United States appointed William Wood, nicknamed “Chemical Bill,” its new ambassador to Afghanistan. In his previous post, Wood championed and oversaw the fumigation of large swaths of the Colombian countryside. The result? For every 67 acres sprayed, only one acre of coca was eradicated. Moreover, production increased by 36 per cent. In addition, the spraying negatively impacted legitimate crops, contaminated water supplies and increased respiratory infections among the exposed populations.

Wood is in Kabul for a single reason – to execute a similar plan in Afghanistan. Poppy production, once held in check by the Taliban government, is exploding – up 60 per cent in 2006. Poppies yield 10 times the value of wheat, so it is unsurprising that about 10 per cent of an otherwise impoverished Afghan population partakes in the illicit poppy harvest. It earns them upwards of $3 billion (U.S.) a year, or roughly 65 per cent of Afghan GDP.

The short-term economic costs and long-term development and health impacts of fumigation will be borne by those whose livelihoods are both directly and indirectly connected to poppy cultivation. Spraying could easily cause public opinion to turn against the Karzai administration and NATO forces, further compromising the mission and increasing the danger to Canadian soldiers.

Given the increased risks this policy poses to both our soldiers and the overall mission, the government’s silence is unconscionable. Others have not been so quiet. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently observed that there is little international support for fumigation. He announced an alternative policy to wean farmers off of opium, one that includes an ambitious plan to top up payments for legal crops, such as wheat.

Such policies, however, are only part of a long-term project. Success will require a holistic view, one that understands the connections between the consumption of illicit drugs in places like Vancouver and their cultivation in Afghanistan. Specifically, this means tackling the demand for opiates. Although 90 per cent of world heroin comes from Afghanistan, the vast majority is consumed in western countries. Blaming Afghan farmers for the problem is as hypocritical as it is ineffective.

Reducing the cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan begins not on the streets of Kandahar, but on the streets of Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.

Fortunately, such policies exist. Insite, Vancouver’s supervised injection site, offers a real first step toward reducing poppy cultivation. This small storefront provides drug users with a sanitary and safe place to inject in the presence of registered nurses. The result: 21 peer-reviewed studies document how Insite diminishes public drug use, reduces the spread of HIV and increases the number of users who enter detox programs.

But Insite does more than get drug use off the street. It is a portal into the health-care system for addicts who are too often shut out. Drug users who visit Insite are an astounding 33 per cent more likely to enlist in a detoxification program. Indeed, Insite has added a second facility, called Onsite, that capitalizes on this success by allowing drug users to immediately access detox and drug treatment services on demand.

Sadly, the Harper government remains ideologically opposed to Insite. It is unclear if the federal government possesses the legal authority to close the site but there is significant concern it will attempt to do so within six months.

The Conservatives should be looking to scale Insite nationally, not contemplating its closing. A national network of injection sites could dramatically reduce heroin use in Canada by channelling more drug users into drug treatment programs. Diminishing the demand for heroin would in turn devalue the poppies from which it is derived. Changing this economic equation is both safer and more effective than fumigation if the goal is shifting Afghan production from poppies to legal crops. Admittedly, Canada’s share of the global consumption of heroin is relatively small, but our success could provide a powerful and effective example to the international community.

To many Canadians, Afghanistan is a world away. But the lives of drug users outside Vancouver’s Carnegie Centre and those of our soldiers in Kandahar are bound together – linked by the international opium trade. What we do in Afghanistan shapes events in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, and vice versa. Canada’s soldiers, drug users and ordinary citizens deserve a government that recognizes this reality.

David Eaves is a frequent commentator on public policy. Taylor Owen is a doctoral student and Trudeau Scholar at the University of Oxford.

Europe as Model Power…

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So it appears that Hillary Clinton isn’t the only person reading Canada25 reports. British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, gave a speech entitled “Europe 2030: Model Power Not Superpower.”

Ring a bell? In 2004 Canada25 published From Middle to Model Power: Recharging Canada’s Role in the World.

A brief excerpt from Miliband speech:

The EU is not and never will be a superpower. An EU of 27 nation states or more is never going to have the fleetness of foot or the fiscal base to dominate. In fact economically and demographically Europe will be less important in the world of 2050 that it was in the world of 1950.

Our opportunity is different. The EU has the opportunity to be a model power.

It can chart a course for regional cooperation between medium-sized and small countries. Through its common action, it can add value to national effort, and develop shared values amidst differences of nationality and religion. As a club that countries want to join, it can persuade countries to play by the rules, and set global standards. In the way it dispenses its responsibilities around the world, it can be a role model that others follow.

This speech is intended to set out the basis of such progress.

Thank you Peter M. for the tip!

Rethinking Pakistan

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I received this email late last night from a friend in Pakistan. Here is a human voice for those who feel disconnected from events halfway around the world (I’ve edited the letter to remove any identifying references):

Hello All,

I am not sure how many of you are aware of this but I was recently arrested. General Musharraf imposed a state of emergency (In effect a “Martial Law”) thereby suspending all civil rights. There is a massive clampdown on media. Several judges have been suspended, some new judges have taken oath, several people continue to be arrested daily.

We were detained for 3 days, initially with no charges and later on charges of disruption of peace. The group was taken from police station to house arrest to central jail – back to house arrest again. We were eventually released with the exception of the X and Y.

There are many people / groups working overtly and covertly towards remediation of the current situation in Pakistan. There is consensus amongst activists on the need for:

  • removal of emergency
  • restoration of sacked judges & removal of newly appointed judges
  • freedom of media
  • any mock-election in the circumstances will be unacceptable

Sympathizers want to create pressure groups, lobby or help in anyway towards removal of the emergency in Pakistan. I would like to invite you all to be a part of this effort and to lobby with your governments and the representatives of Pakistan’s government – where ever you are..

Best,

—-

For those interested in letting the Government of Canada know of your concern regarding the situation in Pakistan, consider writing the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Maxime Bernier at:

House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6
Telephone: (613) 992-8053
Fax: (613) 995-0687
Email: Bernier.M@parl.gc.ca

—-

A sample email (please feel free to copy, edit, cut and paste):

Dear Hon. Maxime Bernier, Minister of Foreign Affairs

I am writing to express my concern over the unfolding events in Pakistan. The suspension of civil rights, suppression of the free press, and the government’s interference in the judicial system directly threaten the rule of law and democratic institutions in Pakistan.

Canada has a long tradition of promoting the principles of democracy and speaking out when they come under threat. Given the gravity of the situation please consider using whatever diplomatic resources you have at your disposal to let General Musharraf know of Canada, and the world’s, shared concern over his actions. Please work with our allies to pressure Pakistan into:

  • removing the state of emergency
  • restoring the recently removed judges & removing those recently appointed
  • restoring freedom of the press; and
  • ensuring the legitimacy of any upcoming election

Mr. Berner, please take action to ensure that the people of Pakistan’s basic democratic rights are preserved.

Sincerely,

(insert name)

Kandahar deal breakers: Op-Ed in Globe and Mail

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Taylor and I published a web-exclusive op-ed on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan in today’s Globe and Mail.

I’ve noticed that the Globe and Mail has implemented a “Recommend this article” button at the bottom of pieces so that readers can “vote” for articles they like. Interesting feature and great filter to see what people say they think is compelling

.

Kandahar deal breakers: The Afghan poll is not a blank cheque

TAYLOR OWEN AND DAVID EAVES
Special to Globe and Mail
November 2, 2007 at 1:03 AM EDT

The results of the poll of Afghans by Environics on behalf of The Globe and Mail, the CBC and La Presse were surprising to many. Afghans are broadly content with their government, happy that Canada is in Afghanistan, and believe the work being done is beneficial and effective. Canadians should be proud. We are making a difference.

What is potentially worrying, however, is the fervour with which the poll was greeted in Canada by some of the mission’s supporters. While a useful reminder of why we are in Afghanistan, this poll is not a blank cheque for any and all future engagement.

Future actions, by us or our allies, could alter the political conditions in Afghanistan, negatively shifting indigenous public opinion. Consequently, this poll should reaffirm the necessity of debating how we engage, and under what conditions we walk away.

Two looming scenarios could derail the mission.

Consider, for instance, the spraying of poppy crops. This winter, under the leadership of the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, the Americans plan to spray opium fields with herbicides. Needless to say, the spraying will have little to no impact on the global availability of illegal opiates.

But the impact on Afghanistan will be dramatic. Opium is critical to the Afghan economy. Kill the poppies and you impoverish the farmers, their families and the communities they support. This will undermine Afghan support for the NATO mission and destabilize the Karzai government.

Perhaps most important, the U.S. spraying campaign undermines the agreed-on division of labour within the NATO alliance. Under the Afghan compact, Britain was given responsibility for counternarcotics. Unilateral spraying by the U.S. violates this agreement. Such actions call into question the terms under which the alliance agreed to function, and on which Canada agreed to sustain its presence in Afghanistan.

In short, a policy in which we have had no input, and we are not executing, will make Afghanistan more dangerous to our soldiers and less conducive to achieving a lasting peace.

A second possible deal breaker is also on the horizon. After the 2008 U.S. presidential election, the Americans are likely to shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. The purpose, strategy and tactics of this surge will have dramatic implications on the nature and potential success of our mission.

This influx of American troops could secure the troublesome Pakistani border and enhance the security environment for reconstruction and development. Alternatively, this force, hardened in Iraq, could engage in the most counterproductive forms of counterinsurgency, driving support to the Taliban. In short, a sea change in the composition of American forces could alter the nature of the mission into one that is unacceptable to Canada.

Neither the opium problem nor the insurgency can be solved with magic bullets. The appropriate policies are complex and long term. There are, however, things we should clearly not do.

In order for us to effectively react to, or ideally influence, these scenarios, it is not enough to be clear on our strategy and objectives. Canada must also outline to its allies the policies that so harm our actions that they negate our involvement.

This is not an empty threat. As Canadians already know, no one is willing to take over our role. Either our work in Kandahar is valuable to NATO, in which case we have influence, or it’s inconsequential, and we should be reconsidering our involvement. If the former, then we possess political leverage with which to shape the mission. What’s more, it is an aberration of responsibility to deploy our troops in the field but allow others to determine the course and strategy of the mission.

The Afghan poll gave us reasons to stay in Kandahar and to be proud of our role, but it is not a blank cheque. We must use our hard-won influence to negotiate with our allies on the terms and implementation of the mission. Poppy spraying and widespread use of aggressive counterinsurgency tactics should be deal breakers. Our military has won Canada real influence in Afghanistan; will our diplomats use it to ensure the mission’s success?