Tag Archives: canadian foreign policy

Afghanistan Op-Ed in Friday's Toronto Star

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Taylor and I had an op-ed we’d written on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan published in the Toronto Star on Friday. Below is the original text we submitted to the Star. I like this version as it contains some of the arguments that got cut, most notably that there is a direct connection between our policies in the downtown eastside of Vancouver and the streets of Khandahar. Interestingly, Harper has promised, in the coming weeks, to table a strategy for Afghanistan. Our hope is that it will reflect some of the concerns outlined below.

Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan

Success in Afghanistan remains as vital today as when the government first sent troops, aid workers and diplomats to Kandahar in August 2005. Many Canadians, however, feel unsure about the mission and want to be assured that our government has a strategy. On February 6th, Prime Minister Harper promised as much, stating his government will table a report summarizing the progress and challenges to date, and will make a significant announcement about our next steps. This is an opportunity to clarify our strategy and to unite both Parliament and the country around the largest deployment of Canadian forces since the Korean war.

First, let us be clear. Canada has an unambiguous purpose in Afghanistan. Failure to secure and rebuild will leave the country as a failed state, a neo-Taliban led fundamentalist regime, or a training ground for terrorists. Any of these would fundamentally threaten Afghan human security, regional stability, and our Canadian national interests.

Prime Minister Harper must reaffirm our commitment and clearly articulate our way forward. We suggest that his report must address three critical areas that if left unchecked, will cause the mission to deteriorate and could cause it to fail.

1. Return to a strategy that complements counterinsurgency with reconstruction and the imposition of the rule of law. Over the past year Prime Minister Harper has increasingly relied on failed US policies and rhetoric, compounding existing problems and creating new ones. In a battle for the hearts and minds of southern Afghans, an aggressive approach will do more harm than good.

Militarily, the killing of even one civilian can do great strategic harm, turning entire villages against us. The Taliban use these casualties to great effect, so that some Afghans now fear international forces more than those who brutally ruled over them.

We need to rethink our counterinsurgency strategy, by relying less on military force, and more on innovative local interactions. As a start, we must curtail the use of air strikes, resume the policy of compensating civilian casualties and determine how our forces can best support reconstruction. The Liberal cabinet deliberately chose not to deploy Leopard tanks and CF-18’s, prioritizing interpersonal contact with Afghans over brute military might. The Prime Minister must explain why we deviated from this strategy.

Most importantly, we need to ensure effective governance. Support for the Taliban derived, in part, from their capacity to impose law and order. Many felt a draconian but predictable governance structure was preferable to chaos and anarchy. Afghan’s desperately want the stability and freedom that comes with the rule of law. If we want to win their hearts and minds we must enable them to establish a just and fair system as quickly as possible.

Diplomatically, the Taliban resurgence in the south remains unchecked. Our problem starts, not from lofty negotiations with Pakistan, but from our own polarised view of the Taliban. Like the failed de-Baathification of Iraq, categorising all who support the Taliban as “against us”, both radicalizes and creates enemies out of moderates whose political support could help stabilize the country.

2. Align Domestic and Foreign Policies. Support for US-backed counter-narcotics tactics endangers the Afghan mission. Poppy eradication destroys the livelihoods of many Afghans and fuels Taliban recruitment. Forcing farmers to shift from poppies, which generate $5,200 per acre, to wheat, which generates $121, is unrealistic. Farmers need a viable alternative. One that curtails the influence of warlords and reduces the global supply of heroin.

Internationally, the Canadian government should ally with the British to develop a regulatory regime that legalizes the purchase of Afghan poppy crops. These crops could be used in the legal production of codeine and morphine, which are scarce in the developing world.

The Canadian Government should also support the Afghan mission by curbing demand for opiates the one place it can – at home. In our globalized world there is a direct link between the poppy fields of Afghanistan and overdose deaths in downtown Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. Domestic policies that reduce demand for illegal opiates – such as renewing Vancouver’s Insite safe injection site – diminish the market for these illicit crops and make it easier to shift Afghan farmers to alternatives.

3. Provide clarity of mission. Canadians must be provided with the necessary information to judge our strategy and progress in Afghanistan. When Canada agreed to the Kandahar mission it sought to balance development, military and diplomatic components. Prime Minister Paul Martin outlined this strategy on February 22nd, 2005 when he described how Canadian Forces “…will be assisted by aid officers, who will identify key assistance projects to help to reduce tensions, and by diplomats, who will work with the provincial and local authorities in building confidence with the local population.” Are we still implementing a 3D strategy? If not, why not? If so, what are the benchmarks with which we can measure our success and evaluate the balance between our defence, development and diplomatic efforts?

Transparency is particularly important for effective humanitarian assistance. Critical questions remain unanswered. Where is our development money going? How much are we spending, and on what? Are these programs symbiotic with our military and diplomatic operations?

The Government would be well advised to establish a development measurement framework with clear milestones, based on the Afghanistan Compact, enabling projects to be evaluated and held accountable. Canada could also appoint a Director of Reconstruction to serve as a counterpart to our military commander and charged with achieving our development objectives. Combined, these initiatives would enhance security by ensuring those programs that most positively impact the lives of local Afghans are prioritized and monitored.

While we are but one partner of a large coalition, smart, targeted Canadian policies can make a substantial difference. Because the Afghanistan mission is difficult and, at times, dangerous it continues to test our leadership. Harper’s report is timely, but will only be valuable if he addresses head on the critical challenges we face. Canada needs a clear strategy for success – one that builds trust, engages in development and reconstruction, and ensures the rule of law, simultaneously. Without such a strategy we risk defaulting to a US-style military approach, neglecting development and diplomacy. This is Canada’s mission – let us ensure we tackle it Canada’s way.

 

[tags]Afghanistan, Canadian Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Canada in the World[/tags]

Vancouver Afghan Mission Dialogue – February 19th

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For those interested in the events in Afghanistan and living in Vancouver, SFU looks like it will be putting on an interesting dialogue. I’m hoping to attend and wanted to let others know about it. (thank you Veronica K. for the heads up!)

Details:

The Vancouver Dialogues on Foreign Affairs will be hosting a dialogue on the “Comparative Perspectives on the War in Afghanistan.” The dialogue will be initiated by:

Mr. Martin Cronin – Consul General, United Kingdom
Mr. Hans Driesser – Consul General, Netherlands
Ms. Joni Scandola – Deputy Consul General, United States of America
Mr. Hans-Michael Schwandt – Consul General, Germany,
Dr. Haider Nizamani – Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia

And the facilitators will be:

Robert Anderson – Morris J. Wosk Centre for Dialogue, SFU
Gordon Longmuir – Vice President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vancouver
Registration and refreshments will be available on the 19th from 5:00 pm onwards and the dialogue will begin at 5:15 pm.

Location:
SFU Vancouver, Harbour Centre,
Room 1420 Segal Room
515 West Hastings Street

Apparently, space is limited so one should RSVP with “syap@sfu”

Understanding Ignatieff – The Intellectual Foundations of a Liberal Interventionist

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For those interested in Liberal Interventionists and foreign policy I just finished reading a piece by one of the sharpest minds I know, my friend Mike Morgan. Entitled, Michael Ignatieff: Idealism and the Challenge of the “Lesser Evil” and published in the Canadian Institute of International Affairs‘ “International Journal” it is a must read for anyone interested in understanding the intellectual origins of Ignatieff’s liberal interventionist thinking. Indeed, this paper is so good it was awarded the Gelber Prize, given to the best article by a junior scholar in the International Journal.

For another interesting piece, Mike also had published this op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. It explains the importance and power of human rights by looking at the role played by the Helsinki Final Act in ending the cold war. It is another great read and is even more closely tied to his academic research…

A quick thank you to the CIIA (which was also very engaged and supportive when Canada25 released From Middle to Model Power) for letting me post Michael’s article on my webpage.

[tags]Ignatieff, Helsinki Final Act, CIIA, Gelber Prize, International Journal, International Relations[/tags]

Job Opportunity for Canada-US buffs

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Just a quick note for friends interested in Canada-US relations. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC is looking to hire a Program Associate for its Canada Institute. You can read more about the opportunity here. I’m a big fan of David Biette, the institute’s Director. He’s thoughtful, friendly and always willing to engage young thinkers with new ideas. The Deadline is January 31st. Thank you Alison L. for the heads up!

Speaking of the Woodrow Wilson Canada Institute, I’m laying over an extra night in Ottawa next week so I can attend their panel on Canada-US Intelligence Sharing in light of Judge O’Connor’s “Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar.” The panel should very much be worth taking in, especially given US Senator Leahy’s growing interest in the case.

The DOW and Model Powers in Afghanistan

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Modeling Power in Afghanistan?

For those interested in Canada and Afghanistan do read Graeme Smith’s piece, “Doing it the Dutch Way in Afghanistan” in Saturday’s Globe and Mail. The Dutch have (apparently) been posted to a rough part of Afghanistan but have yet to suffer a casualty. All this is thanks to a novel strategy… treating the locals well and co opting the local power elite. Some of it may be luck, but it definitely deserves a look into by our boys over at DND. Certainly makes the piece Harper co-authored with Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende in last week’s Globe and Mail a more interesting read. Our strategies may be aligned but our tactics aren’t…

Failing to follow the US economy DOWn:

On a different note, my brother and I had a long conversation on Sunday and he pointed out something quite very interesting… why does the DOW continue to rally despite a stream of (fairly) depressing economic news out of the US? His thought: a significant portion of revenues earned by DOW listed companies now come from overseas operations. Consequently, these corporations are increasingly insulated from the US economic cycle (obviously this has its limits, a collapsing US economy would sink us all). Nonetheless, if true, he posited that the DOW may no longer be a good indicator of the US economy. Maybe the US economy is in worse shape then we think… we just don’t know where to look for the evidence??? Thanks bro.

Afghanistan – The Myth of the Opportunity Cost

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Does anyone under 35 still ‘watch’ the news? It was refreshing to see after a 10 year hiatus. There was a fantastic piece on Iraqis moving to Syria – a half-million Iraqis now live in Damascus with 1500 more arriving everyday. Unfortunately a piece on Afghanistan served as a reminder of why to stick to print and on-line media.

The CBC report focused on the disparity over the accounting around the Afghan mission. It did so by citing a Polaris Institute study that placed the cost at $4.146B – more than double the government’s estimate. Although the CBC noted the report’s flaws, I’m forced to ask: why even cite something that uses such dubious accounting methods?

So what drove the higher costs in the Polaris’ report? They factored in soldiers salaries and operational costs for ships and other equipment. Even I, armed with the knowledge of Econ 110 course I took 10 years ago understand that many of these items are fixed costs – costs the Canadian tax payer must pay regardless of whether our military is operating in Afghanistan or not.

Still more disappointing was a brief Michael Byers interview where he highlights the high cost of replacing ammunition, arguing that the costs (like these) would be lower if Canada was involved in more ‘traditional’ peacekeeping. I know and like Michael – he’s been very supportive of Canada25 and of me personally. Moreover I know he would prefer that we were in Darfur – but he is misleading the public on two fronts: First, as virtually every military expert has pointed out there are very few ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions out there. Moreover, Darfur, in particular, is not the mission I would choose if I was looking for a safe ‘traditional’ mission. It could get quite ugly, especially given how the Sudanese has government expressed, quite explicitly, that they don’t want us there. Second, the costs of placing Canadian troops in Darfur will not necessarily be dramatically cheaper then having them in Afghanistan.

Both Polaris and Michael Byers suggest we are paying an opportunity cost by being in Afghanistan. Specifically, that we could be doing cheaper, safer work elsewhere. This premise should be questioned. Stationing our troops elsewhere may not be dramatically cheaper. And, while it would likely be safer, it would not be the ‘safe’ peacekeeping of days of old. These missions, which tended to be ceasefire monitoring missions between state actors – simply no longer exist. If are willing to use our military to better the world (as both Michael and Polaris suggest they are) then there are no shortage of missions we could engage in… but we should not fail to commit to one because it means we can’t commit to the next one. This logical conclusion of this argument will leave us at home every time, waiting for the next ‘perfect’ mission. The opportunity cost Polaris and Michael refer to needs to be balanced against performing a mission where we have a national interest at stake. Given it was in Afghanistan where forces organized a deadly strike on the civilian population of our largest ally it seems to me that there is, at the very least, a plausible case for why Canada may have an interest in restoring order to that country.

[tags]public policy, Afghanistan, canadian politics[/tags]

Op-Ed in Toronto Star

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Given we are hovering around the 50th anniversary of peacekeeping I wrote this op-ed for the Toronto Star. Of course, as I’m in Vancouver I can’t actually see said piece in print but remain hopeful a newsstand here that carries the star.

That might sound easy but you’d be surprised how little actually makes it over the rockies.

The Toronto Star link no longer works so I’ve copied the op-ed into this post.

Suez at Fifty: (Mis)understanding Pearson

On a small non-descript pillar in the lobby of Foreign Affairs Canada hangs Lester B. Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize — a reminder of Canada’s high-water mark on the international stage.Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his and Canada’s suggestion and deployment of a peacekeeping force that would separate opposing forces in the Suez while a peace plan was implemented. Tomorrow marks the 50th anniversary of the UN General Assembly vote to send that police force into Egypt. It was the birth of peacekeeping. For many Canadians, even 50 years later, the crisis remains the defining moment of Canadian foreign policy, symbolizing Canada’s international role as a pacifist intervener that puts global interests before national self-interest.

But where has this ideal led us? Canada’s foreign policy, with its emphasis on multilateralism and the export of Canadian values, has become ever more focused on the goal of improving the world. And yet, despite these efforts, we have never been weaker or more marginal. Even the recent Conservative counterreaction — with its less critical support of America’s unilateral world view — has failed to provide a viable alternative.

What happened? Did Pearson’s success steer Canada in the wrong direction? Are the Suez Crisis and Peace Prize the bane of our foreign policy?

Sadly, the answer is yes. The blame lies not with Pearson but with us and our collective misunderstanding of the man, his ideas and his legacy. Much of the popular imagery surrounding him is myth, a national exercise in selective memory.

If we are serious about building an effective foreign policy for the 21st century, we must confront the central myth of Canadian diplomacy. Contrary to everything you learned, Pearson was neither a Boy Scout nor a dove. He was so much more: a creative problem solver who respected great-power politics and was unafraid to champion Canada’s national interests.

The 50th anniversary of the Suez Crisis and the invention of peacekeeping is the perfect starting point for such a critical reassessment. Contrary to the mythology, Pearson did not advocate peacekeeping out of a humanitarian desire to prevent some far-off war. Rather, he recognized that unlike other conflicts of the time, the Suez Crisis threatened to draw the United States and Soviet Union into direct confrontation. Consequently, it posed a real and direct threat to Canada.

In 1956, intercontinental ballistic missiles were not a significant part of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Consequently, any war between the superpowers would have been fought in the skies over Canada as American and Soviet strategic bombers raced overhead to deliver their nuclear payloads. Pearson’s peacekeeping was not designed to stop a Middle East war but to prevent nuclear bombs from falling out of the sky over Toronto. Self-interested problem solving, not altruism or idealism, launched the peacekeeping project.

Nor was Pearson a dove. Yes, he recognized the essential role played by economic and social resources in improving society and proposed 0.7 per cent as the benchmark for foreign aid. However, he was equally aware of the critical role played by military power in international relations.

Canadians rarely discuss Pearson’s role as key architect, negotiator and signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As he noted of the Soviet threat: “Our defence in this conflict must be one of increasing and then maintaining our strength, while always keeping open the channels of negotiation and diplomacy. Arms must go hand in hand with diplomacy.” This was a man who, when necessary, was unafraid to confront those whose goals were antithetical to Canadian values.

Pearson was a multilateralist, but he was first and foremost a pragmatist. He understood the importance of great-power politics and the limits of treaties. In his own negotiations, he noted that “… if the great powers have the will and desire to co-operate, even if the machine isn’t perfect, it won’t matter very much. It will work. Therefore, Canada’s preoccupation … is based on the hard realities of the existing international situation.” Recent Canadian foreign policy could not be further from this position. From the Land Mines Treaty to UN reform, Canadian efforts to improve the international system invariably focus on perfecting the machinery irrespective of the interests or participation of the great powers.

Unfortunately, we pay a significant penalty for the Liberals’ and Conservatives’ failure to grasp Pearson’s lessons. The Liberals have been more concerned with getting the principles right regardless of superpower interests. This approach feels good, but it erodes Canada’s influence. In contrast, the Conservatives simply substitute American for Canadian interests. Thus, in places like Afghanistan we adopt American strategies and tactics that alienate the local population and put the mission at risk. As a result, this approach may yield the (occasional) American photo op, but it generates neither influence nor results.

It is at home, however, that the real cost of misunderstanding Pearson is felt. Pearson was a Canadian success because he was pragmatic, creative and solved the problems that challenged Canada. The Department of Foreign Affairs remains a creative problem-solver, but it is rarely allowed to be either pragmatic or self-interested. It is no wonder that Canadians have acquiesced to declining defence, aid and foreign policy budgets.

By transforming our foreign policy into at times, a luxury item, a charitable endeavour focused on “raising our profile” or a poor extension of American foreign policy, our leaders have removed foreign policy from the public’s imagination and made it an easy target for budget cutters.

If our foreign policy is to experience another golden age, it must regain its relevance to Canadians. Our leaders need to understand Canada’s interests, articulate them clearly and find a means to advance them in a manner consistent with our internationalist values. Pearson understood this. It also explains why his legacy has been so difficult to grasp. He defies labelling. He was neither a hawk nor a dove, neither pro- nor anti-American. He simply solved Canadian problems in a way that made the world better for everyone.

If we are willing to shed the mythology surrounding the man, we might once again grasp his nuanced view of the world and Canada’s place in it. Then, maybe, the Suez Crisis and the Peace Prize will cease to be a reminder of what we once were and instead serve as a guide for what we can once again become.

[tags]foreign policy, public policy, canadian politics[/tags]