Tag Archives: R2P

Game Theory: Coalition, Libya, Gaddafi and the exit strategy

2 Replies

Great question Andrew – one that deserves answering.

Here’s my quick assessment. My guess is that the intention of the military action is to give Gaddafi alternatives to fighting. The goal of the no-fly zone and other military activities is designed to bring about a stalemate in the Libyan conflict. It’s goal is to provide the rebels with a clear safe haven which they can defend and sustain themselves. This fact, over time, would foster circumstances by which a negotiated agreement (or internationally mediated agreement) between the Libyan government and the rebels would be seen as necessary by both parties. This could, of course, come about with (or without) Gaddafi’s endorsement – but it would leave him some leverage if he chose to go down this path. Indeed, this political negotiated outcome is an explicit goal of the UN resolution. Moreover, the removal of Gaddafi is not called for. There is a wonderful analysis of the resolution on the BBC website, I’ve extracted the relevant parts below:

Screen-shot-2011-03-20-at-4.48.03-PM

The stalemate outcome analysis also feels plausible given it is hard to imagine the Libyan rebels have either the equipment, training, resources and resolve to topple the Libyan government, with or without air support. Occupying vast swaths of the country may simply be sufficient for the rebels to achieve their goals – to force Gaddafi to accept he can no longer rule the country alone.

So in short, Gaddafi has as simple choice. He can fight and try to win outright (or gain enough leverage so as to create a negotiated outcome that would achieve the same outcome as winning). This has the benefit of huge upside if he wins (with disastrous outcomes from the west – expect some retaliatory terrorism) but it also has more dramatic downsides. If he loses, a complete loss of power, death and/or imprisonment all seem very likely. So this is a high stakes path.

Alternatively, he can choose to negotiate. This route has more ambiguity, something that presents a risk in of itself (a reason why the back channels will matter so much – see below). Here the upsides and downsides are slightly less extreme, although there is a possibility of an outright “win” for Gaddafi is not off the table completely.

Given these choices it wouldn’t be inconceivable for Gaddafi to choose to fight at first to test the resolve of the Allies and the rebels (something we are seeing now) and, should that not work (which it probably won’t, but could) he can always change gears and retreat into a stalemate negotiation and put forward offers that attempt to fracture the rebel coalition. If he can do that, he could still win back enough support to retake the country, find some way to influence the next government, or at worst, be forced to retire.

I’ve tried to sum all this up on a choice matrix below. The sum of it is, the top lefthand outcome seemed a certain outcome a few days ago. Now the allies are forcing the right column back into the picture. Have downsides down the left become significant enough? And the upsides or exit strategies for Gaddafi on the right certain enough to chance the calculus? That’s really the question – but I do think it remains a possibility.

david-eaves-gaddafi-analysis

There are, of course, at least two other parts of the puzzle that need to be in place to ensure that Gaddafi isn’t forced into fighting.

1. Someone would need to back channel to him the allies intentions: that the UN resolution is designed only to force a stalemate, not oust the current government. It might be logical for Gaddafi to then try to continue fighting and see if he can win despite the airstrikes (as this would maximize his leverage) and, he can always choose to back down later.

2. The western allies and the rebels would need to not interpret the retreat or adoption of a defensive posture by Gaddafi forces as signs of imminent collapse and try to press the advantage.

Obviously I do not know if condition number 1 is in place. In regards to condition number 2, this is also unclear, although I suspect the risks are relatively low. The UN resolution would appear to suggest this isn’t as possible but maybe the biggest unknown is France, which appears unusually keen for battle. The worst case scenario here is that Sarkozy sees the conflict as a way to establish is “presidentialness” in the lead up to an election and so seeks to exploit it, dragging the rebels, and the rest of the allies down a path that needn’t be trodden. But even here, the likelihood feels relatively low.

Of course, there are always thousands of other variables and I’m sure there are more than a few holes to poke in this analysis (I’m all ears for those who want to take a stab – would be great to hear more), but hope this is a helpful attempt to answer that important question. If the only choice you give someone is to fight, expect a fight. And it isn’t clear that we have the resources or stomach to fight back to the bitter end, so I hope someone in Paris or Washington DC has thought this through from this perspective.

It's a brave man who advocates against R2P at the U of O…

…and my friend Matteo Legrenzi – assistant professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Ottawa – appears to be just the guy. Remember, this is the University at which Allan Rock is president.

Recently Matteo penned this critical piece on R2P in the Ottawa Citizen. In his trademark style it has some notable harsh lines including:

Occasionally calls to mobilize Canada’s diplomatic network in support of such notions reverberate through Ottawa. The current government is perceived as not incisive enough in the promotion of these “emerging” norms in international relations.

Admittedly, these calls more often than not come from retired politicians who are not in charge of Canada’s foreign policy, let alone world affairs. They are part of that wider syndrome that affects many individuals involved in policy-making after they retire: We are sorry we did not save the world while we were in charge, but let us tell you exactly how to go about it now that we are out of office.

and, because he is an expert on Middle Eastern issues, this quote:

In many Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt, opposition to R2P is the only thing that unites the government and the Islamist opposition.

Matteo and I don’t always agree but I do always enjoy his blunt assessments of Canada’s foreign policy. There is a strain of thinking in Canadian foreign policy that is more obsessed with pursuing the perfect ideal than pragmatically finding solution that works. This is something I’ve occasionally tried to write about. Matteo’s assessments is far tougher, and is the type of piece few Canadians are willing to voice and fewer still like to hear (especially in Ottawa).

What makes Matteo tough is that there is truth to his assessment. Contrary to what some politicians preach R2P is unpopular in many parts of the world and it is not established international norm. George Bush spent 8 years believing that the world could become a certain way if he simply believed and acted that it was as such… it was a dangerous strategy that had devastating results. A similar strategy, even if motivated by what we believe are more noble intentions, will also be fraught with danger.

I know not everyone will agree with Matteo’s analysis, but even those who disagree with his prescription should at least take away that one lesson: reality may bite, but we can never ignore it.