Tag Archives: canadian politics

My “top 10″ 2007 blogging moments: #2

My #2 moment has everything to do with the highs and lows of blogging…

Back on May 11th I wrote this post about a major anti-abortion rally where the rally organizers main banners had the Government of Canada trademark logo on them. My post was fairly apolitical – I considered it merely interesting that the banners were using the logo (which requires Treasury Board’s consent) and so wondering if the Government was either directly funding or endorsing the march (5 Conservative Ministers did participate in the rally).

Several anti-abortion sites started linking to my site and numerous comments were posted outlining the legality of the logo’s use (thank you Tina P.) As a result of the growing online debate the Canadian Press wrote a story about it which the Globe and Mail picked up on and published. This in turn caused Treasury Board  to launch an investigation into the use of the logo which has so far resulted in the Campaign Life Coalition having to put the banners in the closet.

So the cool part about this story is that a humble blog post can end up being picked up the blogosphere, and then by a newswire, which can then land the story in the national newspaper. Hardly a new event, but cool when you are the instigator.

But here is the frustrating part. The Canadian Press story and the Globe and Mail story (now hidden by the G&M’s silly firewall) both reference anonymous “bloggers” in their stories. The Globe and Mail ran this version:

A photo of the banner has been circulating on the Internet since last week, with bloggers using it to suggest that Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Tories appeared to be funding anti-abortion groups when they’ve cut funding for women’s equality programs.

In this version bloggers are made to be part of the story, not its source. While some bloggers were part of the story it was a blogger who picked up the story. If what I’d written had been on the Vancouver Sun’s webpage then journalism etiquette would have dictated that the Globe reference the source. Somehow however, when a blogger is the source, this etiquette goes out the window. One can’t help but infer that this choice springs from traditional media’s contempt for new media in general and bloggers in particular.

So the cool part – the post generated some interesting press.

The uncool part – Canada’s traditional media still doesn’t understand the internet. While they accuse bloggers of being leechers of their content – they do the reverse as well, leeching ideas and discoveries of those who blog without referencing the source. At least (good) bloggers hyperlink to the articles and sources in their posts.

However, for both reasons it was a cool moment for me in blogging – a window into the problems and opportunities of new media in an old media world – which is why it makes number 2 on the list.

Mulroney's desperate defense: "Schreiber lies more than I do"

I’m no lawyer but every time Mulroney opens his mouth a new story seems to emerges. This can’t be good news for him.

For instance, according to the Globe and Mail, Mulroney testified that:

“…he used the cash (given to him by Mr. Screiber) to cover expenses for international travel on behalf of Mr. Schreiber and German manufacturer Thyssen AG, which he said hired him to pitch its light-armoured tanks to major heads of state.”

But a few months ago, he was claiming that the money was given to him to promote Mr. Schreiber’s pasta business.

In another instance:

“Mr. Mulroney said he was under no legal obligation to reveal the cash payments during sworn testimony in a 1996 defamation suit against Ottawa, and that he paid taxes on the funds after Mr. Schreiber was charged in 1999 to “clean” his files.”

So even though that investigation was seeking to determine if Mulroney had received money from Mr. Screiber, Mulroney didn’t feel it necessary to share this information? I suspect the public is going to start demanding that Mulroney pay back the $2.1 Million the government paid hims as part of his defamation suit. Clearly money did exchanged hands under dubious circumstances and the RCMP was quite right to investigate. The fact that they may have charged him with the wrong crime seems a lot less problematic now that we know manila envelops full of cash were going back and forth.

Indeed, what makes matters worse is that Mulroney only decided to declare the income after Schreiber was arrested for tax evasion. Mulroney likely knew that all of Screiber’s financial transactions would be scrutinized and that his own misdeeds would come to light. This, and not some new found guilt, appears to have motivated Mulroney.

Ultimately, Mulroney’s case before the Ethics Committee seemed to rest on the strategy of “you can trust me more than you can trust Schreiber.” It is true that given is pending deportation, Schreiber has every reason to lie. But given that Mulroney now has a proven track record of misleading the public, he is no more trustworthy. Arguing “he lies more!” doesn’t have the same ring as “he lies and I don’t.”

Consequently, if this is his best defense it is a desperate one. I very much doubt that, as he requested, the matter will be closed. The final decline of Mulroney may have just begun.

Afghanistan and Vancouver's Downtown Eastside

Taylor and I published this op-ed in today’s Toronto Star. It is not often that one can show a direct link between our soldiers in Afghanistan and Canadians in downtown Vancouver.

We originally entitled the piece: From Kandahar to Carnegie – dealing with the opium trade at home and abroad a title I think sounds better. I suspect however that the Star justly felt the reference to the Carnegie Centre – the community centre that serves Vancouver’s downtown eastside – may have been to obscure, especially for Toronto readers.

Failed strategy connects Afghan fields, city streets

Dec 07, 2007 04:30 AM

David Eaves
Taylor Owen

In the coming months, under the leadership of the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, U.S. private contractors will likely attempt to fumigate poppies in Afghanistan. Around the same time, the Canadian government will decide whether to shut down the Insite supervised injection site in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.

The two policies are inextricably linked and unambiguously bad.

In April, the United States appointed William Wood, nicknamed “Chemical Bill,” its new ambassador to Afghanistan. In his previous post, Wood championed and oversaw the fumigation of large swaths of the Colombian countryside. The result? For every 67 acres sprayed, only one acre of coca was eradicated. Moreover, production increased by 36 per cent. In addition, the spraying negatively impacted legitimate crops, contaminated water supplies and increased respiratory infections among the exposed populations.

Wood is in Kabul for a single reason – to execute a similar plan in Afghanistan. Poppy production, once held in check by the Taliban government, is exploding – up 60 per cent in 2006. Poppies yield 10 times the value of wheat, so it is unsurprising that about 10 per cent of an otherwise impoverished Afghan population partakes in the illicit poppy harvest. It earns them upwards of $3 billion (U.S.) a year, or roughly 65 per cent of Afghan GDP.

The short-term economic costs and long-term development and health impacts of fumigation will be borne by those whose livelihoods are both directly and indirectly connected to poppy cultivation. Spraying could easily cause public opinion to turn against the Karzai administration and NATO forces, further compromising the mission and increasing the danger to Canadian soldiers.

Given the increased risks this policy poses to both our soldiers and the overall mission, the government’s silence is unconscionable. Others have not been so quiet. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently observed that there is little international support for fumigation. He announced an alternative policy to wean farmers off of opium, one that includes an ambitious plan to top up payments for legal crops, such as wheat.

Such policies, however, are only part of a long-term project. Success will require a holistic view, one that understands the connections between the consumption of illicit drugs in places like Vancouver and their cultivation in Afghanistan. Specifically, this means tackling the demand for opiates. Although 90 per cent of world heroin comes from Afghanistan, the vast majority is consumed in western countries. Blaming Afghan farmers for the problem is as hypocritical as it is ineffective.

Reducing the cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan begins not on the streets of Kandahar, but on the streets of Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.

Fortunately, such policies exist. Insite, Vancouver’s supervised injection site, offers a real first step toward reducing poppy cultivation. This small storefront provides drug users with a sanitary and safe place to inject in the presence of registered nurses. The result: 21 peer-reviewed studies document how Insite diminishes public drug use, reduces the spread of HIV and increases the number of users who enter detox programs.

But Insite does more than get drug use off the street. It is a portal into the health-care system for addicts who are too often shut out. Drug users who visit Insite are an astounding 33 per cent more likely to enlist in a detoxification program. Indeed, Insite has added a second facility, called Onsite, that capitalizes on this success by allowing drug users to immediately access detox and drug treatment services on demand.

Sadly, the Harper government remains ideologically opposed to Insite. It is unclear if the federal government possesses the legal authority to close the site but there is significant concern it will attempt to do so within six months.

The Conservatives should be looking to scale Insite nationally, not contemplating its closing. A national network of injection sites could dramatically reduce heroin use in Canada by channelling more drug users into drug treatment programs. Diminishing the demand for heroin would in turn devalue the poppies from which it is derived. Changing this economic equation is both safer and more effective than fumigation if the goal is shifting Afghan production from poppies to legal crops. Admittedly, Canada’s share of the global consumption of heroin is relatively small, but our success could provide a powerful and effective example to the international community.

To many Canadians, Afghanistan is a world away. But the lives of drug users outside Vancouver’s Carnegie Centre and those of our soldiers in Kandahar are bound together – linked by the international opium trade. What we do in Afghanistan shapes events in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, and vice versa. Canada’s soldiers, drug users and ordinary citizens deserve a government that recognizes this reality.


David Eaves is a frequent commentator on public policy. Taylor Owen is a doctoral student and Trudeau Scholar at the University of Oxford.

Kandahar deal breakers: Op-Ed in Globe and Mail

Taylor and I published a web-exclusive op-ed on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan in today’s Globe and Mail.

I’ve noticed that the Globe and Mail has implemented a “Recommend this article” button at the bottom of pieces so that readers can “vote” for articles they like. Interesting feature and great filter to see what people say they think is compelling

.

Kandahar deal breakers: The Afghan poll is not a blank cheque

TAYLOR OWEN AND DAVID EAVES
Special to Globe and Mail
November 2, 2007 at 1:03 AM EDT

The results of the poll of Afghans by Environics on behalf of The Globe and Mail, the CBC and La Presse were surprising to many. Afghans are broadly content with their government, happy that Canada is in Afghanistan, and believe the work being done is beneficial and effective. Canadians should be proud. We are making a difference.

What is potentially worrying, however, is the fervour with which the poll was greeted in Canada by some of the mission’s supporters. While a useful reminder of why we are in Afghanistan, this poll is not a blank cheque for any and all future engagement.

Future actions, by us or our allies, could alter the political conditions in Afghanistan, negatively shifting indigenous public opinion. Consequently, this poll should reaffirm the necessity of debating how we engage, and under what conditions we walk away.

Two looming scenarios could derail the mission.

Consider, for instance, the spraying of poppy crops. This winter, under the leadership of the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, the Americans plan to spray opium fields with herbicides. Needless to say, the spraying will have little to no impact on the global availability of illegal opiates.

But the impact on Afghanistan will be dramatic. Opium is critical to the Afghan economy. Kill the poppies and you impoverish the farmers, their families and the communities they support. This will undermine Afghan support for the NATO mission and destabilize the Karzai government.

Perhaps most important, the U.S. spraying campaign undermines the agreed-on division of labour within the NATO alliance. Under the Afghan compact, Britain was given responsibility for counternarcotics. Unilateral spraying by the U.S. violates this agreement. Such actions call into question the terms under which the alliance agreed to function, and on which Canada agreed to sustain its presence in Afghanistan.

In short, a policy in which we have had no input, and we are not executing, will make Afghanistan more dangerous to our soldiers and less conducive to achieving a lasting peace.

A second possible deal breaker is also on the horizon. After the 2008 U.S. presidential election, the Americans are likely to shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. The purpose, strategy and tactics of this surge will have dramatic implications on the nature and potential success of our mission.

This influx of American troops could secure the troublesome Pakistani border and enhance the security environment for reconstruction and development. Alternatively, this force, hardened in Iraq, could engage in the most counterproductive forms of counterinsurgency, driving support to the Taliban. In short, a sea change in the composition of American forces could alter the nature of the mission into one that is unacceptable to Canada.

Neither the opium problem nor the insurgency can be solved with magic bullets. The appropriate policies are complex and long term. There are, however, things we should clearly not do.

In order for us to effectively react to, or ideally influence, these scenarios, it is not enough to be clear on our strategy and objectives. Canada must also outline to its allies the policies that so harm our actions that they negate our involvement.

This is not an empty threat. As Canadians already know, no one is willing to take over our role. Either our work in Kandahar is valuable to NATO, in which case we have influence, or it’s inconsequential, and we should be reconsidering our involvement. If the former, then we possess political leverage with which to shape the mission. What’s more, it is an aberration of responsibility to deploy our troops in the field but allow others to determine the course and strategy of the mission.

The Afghan poll gave us reasons to stay in Kandahar and to be proud of our role, but it is not a blank cheque. We must use our hard-won influence to negotiate with our allies on the terms and implementation of the mission. Poppy spraying and widespread use of aggressive counterinsurgency tactics should be deal breakers. Our military has won Canada real influence in Afghanistan; will our diplomats use it to ensure the mission’s success?

the significance of the afghan poll

In anticipation of the new Environics poll of Afghans I engaged in my biannual ceremonial watching of the CBC news. This poll is groundbreaking stuff since, until now, we’ve had very little data on what Afghans think. What is interesting about the poll isn’t the results per say, but the strength of the results. Equally interesting is the impact this could have politically here at home.

The Results

For example, people’s opinion of Canadian troops in Kandahar is remarkably positive, with 60% having a favourable opinion.

In addition – given the press reports we receive here in Canada – Afghans are actually comparatively upbeat about the effectiveness of the mission is itself.

I’d encourage everyone to take a look at the raw results yourself, they can be found on the Environics webpage.

The political impact

Before we begin, a caveat. I’m sure there are those who are thinking: this poll was commissioned by Conservatives and was rigged to ensure a desirable outcome. This could not be further from the truth. This poll is the brain child of Environics which wanted to bring the Afghan perspective into the debate. It is important to note that Environics is the same company that brought us Fire and Ice, a book that presents a rather unflattering picture of America and argues Americans and Canadians are becoming more different. This is no right wing organization – if anything it leans the opposite way.

I argued earlier in the week that the Liberal position on Afghan has been pretty suspect. This poll makes things worse. To be blunt, it’s a disaster for the NDP and damaging for the Liberals.

The NDP position has been based on the assumption that the mission is a mess. Now we have evidence that Afghans actually want Canadians there, they don’t like the Taliban and they believe we are doing a relatively good job. We can no longer claim we’d be leaving a divided country that doesn’t want us.

For the Liberals the problem is similar – this is the party that spent two decades constructing a foreign policy around the human security agenda. More importantly, it has always wanted Canada’s foreign policy resources to “do good.” It would appear that the Afghans believe we are doing just that. In addition, if we left, we would jeopardizes this success. Both the NDP and the Liberals now have to explain why we should leave and risk abandoning the Afghans.

However, the poll creates a nuanced public policy challenge – one the Conservatives are susceptible to succumbing to. The danger is this poll will eliminate the option to leave Afghanistan under any conditions. This would be a grave mistake. There are a number of things that could dramatically alter the conditions that created this poll’s results. For example, spraying the opium fields with pesticides could turn significant parts of the population against both the international force and the Karzai government. Making the assumption that these polling numbers would be the same under such conditions could trap us in a rapidly deteriorating situation. For the time being, it appears the locals believe we are effective, and are grateful. If our allies take actions that would create a new set of conditions that threaten to destabilize the current environment then we should be prepared to announce we too will take action, including the possibility of pulling out.

Where are the progressives on Net Neutrality?

I’m excited to see that the Green Party has included a section on Net Neutrality in it’s platform.

4. Supporting the free flow of information

The Internet has become an essential tool in knowledge storage and the free flow of information between citizens. It is playing a critical role in democratizing communications and society as a whole. There are corporations that want to control the content of information on the internet and alter the free flow of information by giving preferential treatment to those who pay extra for faster service.

Our Vision

The Green Party of Canada is committed to the original design principle of the internet – network neutrality: the idea that a maximally useful public information network treats all content, sites, and platforms equally, thus allowing the network to carry every form of information and support every kind of application.

Green Solutions

Green Party MPs will:

  • Pass legislation granting the Internet in Canada the status of Common Carrier – prohibiting Internet Service Providers from discriminating due to content while freeing them from liability for content transmitted through their systems.

Liberals, NDP… we are waiting…

the manley inquiry into Afghanistan

Rudyard Griffiths has been calling for a blue ribbon commission into the future of Canada’s role in Afghanistan for a while. The good news is that the Prime Minister started listening to him. The bad news is that the Liberals are unhappy about it.

To date, the Conservatives have not had an inspired foreign policy. Indeed, they seem to lack confidence on this issue – something that may spring from the fact that this government is built around the old provincial Harris team who obviously didn’t have to think much about the subject. This insecurity – along with a desire to take a politically sensitive issue off the table in time for a possible fall election – has however forced them to adopt Griffiths’ advice.

This is good news for Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. The current debate on the Afghanistan mission has been mired in partisan battles shaped more by who can exploit the situation for political gain than by assessing what is the best option for Canada. On an issue this sensitive and important a blue ribbon panel can help establish a baseline of facts and set the terms of debate in a manner that hopefully elevate the level of discussion. This will help ensure that the country’s best interests – as opposed to those of a given political party – will be the first and foremost criteria of evaluation. In principal this should make it harder for the NDP and those like Michael Byers who advise them, to continue to call for a unilateral withdrawal without discussing the full consequences of such a choice.

In short, if the panel (John Manley, Pamela Wallin, Derek Burney, Paul Tellier and Jake Epp) does its job it can help ensure that Canadians make the best choice for Canada.

John_ManleyThe bad news is that Liberals are in a huff about the fact that John Manley’s appointment as the head of this panel insulates the conservative from a sticky issue in the lead up to an election. I can understand how one would lament the loss of a potential “wedge issue” that might have undermined Conservative support, especially in Quebec. But veiled attacks on Manley paint the party in a bad light. And for good reason. Liberals should be proud of Manley – or any Canadian – who attempts to bring coherence, clarity and a basic level of consensus to a debate of national importance.

Liberals are only mad at Manley because they know that although this commission shows the Conservatives are desperate (they are), it also exposes the shallowness of their own policy on the issue. And let’s be clear, the Liberals don’t have a coherent policy on Afghanistan. The current Liberal position of pulling our troops out after 2009 simply plays off the public’s fears. It does nothing to address the actual goals of why Canada is in Afghanistan. It’s odd to watch the party that championed Human Security and R2P argue for getting the military out of a country where the previous government had a complete disrespect for human rights, marginalized women and generally terrorized its own population. Nor is the notion that “it’s somebody else’s turn” inspiring the public. Either a) this mission is important and so if no one else will do it, we must or b) it’s not, and we should get out (and, by the way, if this was the case why did you get us in in the first place?).

Moreover, let’s talk about the costs of leaving – there are people whose lives will be in significantly greater risk if Canada pulls out and the risks of Afghanistan becoming an operational centre for global terrorism are real. Conversely, let’s talk about the costs of staying – such as the fact that Afghanistan is going to be further destabilized this winter when the Americans start spraying Opium crops with pesticides. If this is the way the US is going to behave, maybe we should leave.

But this is the type of nuanced discussion neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives (it’s not worth mentioning the NDP) are willing to have. All that has happened is that the Conservatives realized that this superficial discussion would hurt them more and so they got smart.

So rather than getting mad at Manley Liberals should start coming up with a coherent policy on Afghanistan.

The death of MMP

Anyone who’s followed this blog semi-regularly knows I’m not a fan of MMP so it’s no surprise that I’m pleased to see MMP was soundly thumped in the referendum today. What is remarkable is how soundly the resolution was defeated (63% to 37% at last count).

As a result, the best thing about this outcome is its decisiveness. Unlike BC, Ontario won’t be burdened with another referendum on the issue (as unfortunantely BC will likely be).

Review of Michael Byers "Intent for a Nation"

Today, Taylor and I published a review of Michael Byers “Intent for a Nation: A Relentlessly Optimistic Manifesto for Canada’s Role in the World” in Embassy Magazine.

Attached below is the full length version – we strayed far beyond Embassy’s word count…

Intent for a Nation

Michael Byers, Professor of Politics and International Law and regular public commentator, describes his book, Intent for a Nation: A relentlessly optimistic manifesto for Canada’s role in the world, as a challenge to Grant’s generation-defining thesis. Canada, Byers argues, may not be on an inalterable path towards full US integration.

intent for a nationBut contrary to its title, Intent for a Nation does not reject its namesakes’ thesis – it embraces it wholeheartedly. Lament for a Nation paints Canada as a country already lost to the forces of Americanization. Byers, in contrast, places Canada on a precipitous edge, teetering on the abyss. Indeed Canada position is so precarious, Byers himself twice believes the country doomed: once after the “Free-Trade election” and again after Chrétien signs NAFTA. And yet, a handful of increasingly rare policy decisions manage, albeit just, to preserve a distinct Canada and Canadian foreign policy. In reality ‘relentlessly optimism’ simply means believing Canada can still be saved.

Intent for a Nation is thus a firmly nationalist treatise – a book that sees Canada under immediate and imminent threat from Americanization – and this perspective is the source of its strengths and weaknesses. As a nationalistic critique, it is often powerful, providing important insights. At the same time, its anti-American lens is extremely limiting. Byers, like Grant or Hurtig, overweight’s America’s role, holding it responsible for almost all Canada and the world’s problems.

As such, this book is as much about America and Americanization as it is about Canadian Foreign Policy. In virtually every instance the analysis inevitably leads to the same conclusion. Canada’s choice is black or white – assimilation or isolation. A choice Byers echoes with chapter titles like “Do We Really Need a Continental Economy?” The face that such a course of action would be a best difficult, and at worst disastrous, is a window into the book’s central limitation – its inability to move beyond critique. For a self titled ‘manifesto,’ the book focuses almost exclusively on what Canada shouldn’t do, and says little about what it should.

That said, it is refreshing to read a strong nationalist critique of Canadian foreign policy, particularly one that adeptly engages on military issues. The argument that the goals and purposes of Canada’s military are increasingly shaped by its integration with US forces is the book’s most convincing discussion. A Canadian military that fully integrates with its US counterpart does indeed run the risk of preparing for, and executing, US styled military operations. As military strategist Martin van Creveld points out, American Forces: “Combine aggressiveness with impatience. Putting blind faith in technology and using far more firepower than is needed, they regularly end up by alienating whomever they face-as happened in Vietnam, Somalia, and now in Iraq.” Do we want to spend (literally) billions to emulate the many idiosyncrasies of the US model? More importantly, if we mold our tools after America’s hammers, should we be surprised if we increasingly see global problems as nails?

In a similar vein, Byers’ discussion of the Canadian Arctic rightly stands in notable contrast to much of the military-centric discourse on ‘securing’ the north. And his treatment of war on terror, racial profiling, and missile defense are all notably level- headed. It is clear that Byers has an important voice to add to the debate. Indeed the problem in each of these cases isn’t what he says, its’ that he doesn’t say more. A strong critique is important, but we were frequently left wondering, what does Byers think Canada should do?

As a manifesto, the book provides few options. Both the chapters on climate change and terrorism never take the reader beyond past mistakes. There are hints of possibilities (such as increased individual responsibility for emission control, and greater use of legal mechanisms in the war on terror), but at markedly few points does Byers provide directions for action. Indeed, his regular calls for national leadership, with little indication of a policy platform, become frustrating.

Take, for example, the treatment of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Byers rightly argues that Axworthy showed prescient leadership by convening the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). He then argues that Paul Martin, and by extension Allan Rock, sold out by presenting a watered down version to the UN General Assembly in 2005.

The principle of R2P is that the international community should have a mechanism to intervene when sovereign governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens. Faced with the problem of how this principle should be actualized, Martin argued that the Security Council’s threshold for the authorization of Chapter VII intervention should be expanded to include a wider range of harms. Byers suggests a more appropriate course would have been to “embark on a long and difficult campaign to shift international opinion towards a right to unauthorized humanitarian intervention.”

This is a strikingly ambiguous, and controversial, statement regarding one of the central foreign policy challenges of our time. We are provided with no indication of what a different legal framework might look like, nor do we receive guidance on how this would mitigate the central concern of R2P’s critics – its abuse by powerful countries over weak ones. Indeed, this policy challenge was so difficult, that the ICISS commission itself deferred answering it and it is the underlying reason why Martin chose to work within the UN framework rather than against it.

In addition to failing to flesh out his policy prescriptions, the few sentences he does provide do not form a coherent list of policies, but rather a catalog of often conflicting reactions.

For example, in a chapter entitled “Climate Change” Byers speaks urgently, but vaguely, of the need for a green economy. But later, in a chapter entitled “Do We Really Need a Continental Economy?” he laments the decline of east-west tractor-trailer traffic across the country and rise of north-south traffic between Canada and the United States. And yet comparatively, this east-west traffic was grossly inefficient. Trade between Seattle and Vancouver is much more efficient – and thus green – than that between Vancouver and Toronto. Byers may be both a nationalists and environmentalist, but he never tackles the tough issue of prioritizing or contextualizing these two policy objectives with respect to one another.

Another example emerges from his treatment of Afghanistan and Darfur. “Where would we gain the most?” Byers asks. “Continuing with a failing counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan or leading a humanitarian intervention to stop the genocide in Darfur.” The choice appears clear: deploy our military to Darfur to project our humanitarian interests. But in order to do so, we would need to pull our troops out of Afghanistan. While our role in Afghanistan should be debated, there are real humanitarian costs to leaving. Not accounting for these costs, in an argument on the moral imperative of inserting military forces – against the desire of its government – into another Muslim country rife with sectarian conflict and radical jihadism is highly problematic.

Similarly, calling Afghanistan a “US led war in Asia” and Darfur a peacekeeping mission trivializes the former and romanticizes the latter. This month rebels killed 10 African Union peacekeepers and a further 50 are missing. Darfur could be every bit as complicated and dangerous as Afghanistan. Both are examples of complex emergencies in which new, and in large part Canadian-led concepts such as 3D and human security, are being applied.

One senses that Byers disdain for Afghanistan springs not from the nature or intent of the mission, but simply that it was American instigated and led. When discussing Afghanistan this bias is merely distracting, but in other cases, the distortions border on the absurd. For example, Byers rightly criticizes successive Canadian governments for failing to give .7% of GDP in overseas development assistance (ODA). However, when assessing why Canada has failed to do so, his culprit is all too predictable. The United States – who contributes a mere .1% of GDP – fear their international reputation will suffer if Canada fulfills its ODA commitment and thus exerts subtle pressure which keeps our contributions down. Putting aside that no examples of how this nefarious influence is exerted, are we really suppose to believe the United States cares how much Canada donates in ODA?

What makes this bias all the more frustrating is that without it, the book would be far more compelling. Byers considers Canada a powerful country, capable of greatness on the international stage. In interviews he fleshes out how internally generated insecurities often impede our success. It is a sentiment we agree with, and to which history can attest. When Canada chooses to lead, our track record has been remarkable. But in his book, this insight is crowded out by the obsession with the United States, who is inevitable blamed for our shortcomings.

If Canada is a powerful country, how should it exert its influence? The final chapter on Global Citizenship is clearly intended to provide an inspiring framework that can tackle the problems Byers identifies. But the conclusion does not unify the book’s varying themes and critiques. It is hard to find the link between the concept of global citizenship proposed and the challenges outlined in the previous 9 chapters. Moreover, Byers’ definition of Global Citizenship ultimately does not differ from those he critiques, as well as others he doesn’t mention, making it difficult to tease out his unique contribution to the debate over this term.

In addition, the book’s obsession with the United States ultimately hinders, rather than enhances, its analysis. Byers’ examples – standing up to the United States and charting a path not determined solely by economic factors – of how Global Citizenship can be actualized at the national, as opposed to individually focus principally on Canada-US relations. Canada must preserve its ability to act independently on the international stage when necessary. But Byers conflates our capacity to act independently with our choice to do so. Are there troubling aspects to the Canada-US relationship? Absolutely. But Byers seems less interested fixing them than firewalling the country off from the United States. Is disengagement and isolationism the logical conclusion of global citizenship? Surely being sovereign, and a global citizen, entails more than not being American?

But this criticism should not diminish the role Michael Byers’ and his book serve as agent provocateurs. Intent for a Nation was written to spark discussion, and in that spirit it is an important contributor to the national debate. He is right to argue that Canada can do more and that message deserves an audience, both in Ottawa and across the country.

As a stand alone piece however, the book lacks cohesion, contains vague and conflicting advice, and overemphasizes the role of the United States. These issues largely spring from the fact that Intent for a Nation embraces the same flawed analysis of its namesake. Four decades after the publication of Lament for a Nation, nationalists continue to cling to the same gloomy predictions. All this despite the fact that Canada has retained its independence, and according to some pollsters, has become increasingly different from the America. Maybe its time we moved beyond the constraints of this thesis?

Even Gordon Gibson doesn't like MMP

Gordon Gibson, a supporter of Citizen assemblies and a big supporter of BC-STV (the electoral system proposed by the BC Citizen’s assembly) explains why he believes Mixed Member Proportionate (MMP) – the electoral system proposed by the Ontario Citizen’s assembly – is actually worse then the current First Past the Post (FPTP) system.

In a Globe and Mail op-ed, Gibson explain:

As to differences in political culture, it may be that B.C. is more independent-minded and that political parties are more trusted in Ontario. That would be consistent with the results – STV boosts the backbencher, voter choice and the election of some actual independents. MMP gives even more power to parties and party discipline than our present system.

Why would Gibson assert that MMP gives more power to parties and party discipline? Simple.

Members that represent ridings derive their power from their constituency. If a proposed bill threatens the interest of their constituents they go and lobby the party leader. Their leverage in this conversation is the fact that, if the bill is sufficiently important to their constituents, it is actually in their interests to vote against it (and thus preserve their electoral chances).

In an MMP system, the proportionally elected members are divorced from the electorate. They don’t represent anyone per se, and so don’t have a constituency. Thus they cannot vote against the party leader. What is their leverage? If they do vote against the party, one can bet the party leader will use their significant power to remove that member from the “party list” during the next election. Dislodging a member from his/her constituency is possible, but it is messy and difficult. Dislodging a proportional member from a party list however, would be relatively simple. This is why MMP further concentrates power in the hands of party leaders.

What makes MMP even more disconcerting is the knock on effect these weak proportionally elected members would have on traditional members. With a certain number of votes safely in their back pocket, party leaders would be even more secure in bullying their member into towing the line.

MMP supporters will counter by pointing to the lack of free votes as an indication of a lack of democracy. But as the above analysis should indicate, a lack of free votes is not the problem. There are few free votes because members exert influence over party leaders to have them modify or abandon proposed legislation before voting becomes necessary. Again, this is only possible because they possess the leverage created by having a constituency.

Either way, it is interesting when a significant reformer and FPTP opponent – like Gordon Gibson – feels it neccessary to write an op-ed about how MMP is worse the FPTP. That should give anyone pause.

As an aside: Gibson starts off his op-ed by explaining that the Ontario citizen assembly was fundamentally flawed. Citizen’s Assembly (CA) advocates must be seething as they like to argue that although new and imperfect, each CA builds on the lessons and strengths of the previous one.